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From the end of the twentieth century up to these days, Russia underwent 
several transformations, including the image one, due to economic and political ups 
and downs. Each time, the strategy of Russia's Foreign Cultural Policy was adjusted 
or revised following the interests corresponding to that time's challenges. First of 
all, the construction of a national concept of foreign cultural policy depends on the 
political ideology adopted in a given society and on the prevailing ideas about the 
nature of cultural processes and the priority of solving cultural problems for the 
state. However, in each region where the interests of Russia are represented, such 
an approach is individual.  
Activities in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region are part of Russia's Arctic 
policy. For Russia, the Arctic region's importance is primarily due to considerations 
of security and resource extraction (Heininen et al. 2014, 4). Indeed, today the 
Arctic is a promising region both economically and strategically. On the other 
hand, culture is a tool that makes it possible to expand and spread influence and 
maintain the country's image in the international arena, thereby earning favor 
concerning activities that are not related to culture. 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region is a regional association of territories 
around the Barents Sea. Its main idea is to develop international cooperation. 
Russia is one of the four participating countries pursuing its interests in this region. 
The BEAR embraces the territories of Finland (Oulu Region, Lapland, North 
Karelia, Kainuu), Sweden (Norbotten, Västerbotten), Russia (Arkhangelsk, 
Karelia, Nenets, Komi, Murmansk) and Norway (Finnmark, Troms, Nordland). 
One of the main goals of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (the leading 
institution for cross-border cooperation at the BEAR) is to preserve culture, seek 
communication through cultural projects and help in research projects. These goals 
are mentioned in various programs dedicated to the development of the BEAR in the 
culture field (Barents Voices 2003-2006, New Winds in the Barents Region 2008-
2010, New Horizons in the Barents Region 2011-2013, Strategies for Cultural 
Cooperation in the Barents Region 2014-2018 and Creative Barents 2019-2023). 
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Various cultural festivals related to cultural cooperation in the Barents Region are 
implemented annually in Russia. Of course, participation in any organization or 
regional collaboration is a way for the state to learn, increase the prestige 
internationally as well as to achieve and defend particular national interests. 
1.1. Research Gap & Research Questions 
The Arctic becomes a crucial topic in international relations today. In the 
current realities this direction is one of the most important places of a political 
struggle. Russia has its own ambitions, claims, and according to its position on the 
globe it has rights and preferences to use such a promising region as the Arctic. In 
this regard, the Euro-Arctic direction can be considered a uniquely located 
geostrategic and geo-economic base of Russia's interests and projects in the Arctic. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to find out: 
What goals does Russia pursue by participating in and organizing 
cooperation in the Arctic region?  
To achieve the goal, several additional questions were posed: 
1. What is cultural cooperation for Russian foreign policy? 
2. What is the reason for the existence of international cultural cooperation in 
the BEAR? 
3. What is the role of Russia in cultural projects in the BEAR? 
4. Has COVID-19 changed the position of Russia in the region?    
1.2 Methodology and Data 
In order to most fully answer the main research question, a multiple case study 
was used. The study chronologically lists the cultural and scientific projects in which 
Russia took part in one way or another. Five Barents Cultural programs were taken 
as cases for this thesis.  
According to Florian Kohlbacher, “case studies seem to be the preferred 
strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions were posed, when the investigator had little 
control over events, and when the focus was on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life context” (Kohlbacher 2006). In a multiple case study, the researcher 
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examined multiple cases to understand the differences and similarities between them 
(Baxter and Jack 2008, 25). According to Gustafsson, “an all-embracing fact was 
that the evidence created from a multiple case study were measured strong and 
reliable” (Gustafsson 2017, 3). 
Case studies helped in a close and scrupulous examination of projects both at 
the institutional and local levels. This approach helped to look at things and analyze 
events realistically. Consequently, I used the program documents and declarations 
of Russia on cultural policy and the development of the Arctic regions and doctrines 
and program documents for the development of the BEAC to see the shift of Russia's 
official position within the BEAR. 
The main research method was qualitative content analysis. The introduction 
of content analysis into political research is associated with the name of the 
American political scientist G. Lasswell, who first used this method when studying 
political leaders' speeches, educational and scientific literature of Germany and the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s – 1940s. The method's essence was to translate textual 
information into quantitative data, which was used in subsequent mathematical 
processing. First, the frequency of using keywords and phrases (semantic blocks) in 
the text is determined. Then the frequency of their use is calculated in relation to 
each other and to the total amount of information (Semyonova 2010, 103-104).  
In contrast to quantitative analysis, qualitative content analysis is focused on 
the idiographic approach. It relies on an inductive method of obtaining knowledge, 
emphasizing the singularity of the phenomena under study, their ambiguity, and their 
complexity. The main difference between qualitative and quantitative content 
analysis is that quantitative analysis is focused on explaining the content, on the 
general principles of material analysis, on the search for the universal through 
analysis, decomposition of the text into its constituent parts, and analysis of these 
variables. The qualitative content analysis aims to understand the phenomena under 
study; to analyze the relations and processes between these phenomena; it is focused 
on covering the entire set and complexity of the studied phenomena and aims to 
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study isolated cases. Qualitative content analysis tasks are to formulate hypotheses, 
create new theories, deepen the material under study, classify and test these 
hypotheses and theories (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 65). German researcher Meiring 
believes that “Any recorded communication, including transcripts of interviews, 
documents, articles, can be the object of qualitative content analysis” and identifies 
five areas of application of qualitative content analysis:  
• communication (content analysis itself); 
• hermeneutics (as the art of interpretation); 
• qualitative social research (interpretive paradigm); 
• literary criticism and psychology (Mayring 2000). This analysis is 
implemented in the third chapter of the thesis.  
Qualitative content analysis was chosen because the research was based on 
program documents, description of project activities, doctrines, and strategies of 
Russia, the BEAR, and the BEAC. Qualitative content analysis is applicable in 
studies that “pay attention to the content or the contextual meaning of the text” 
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 126-127).  
Thus, the qualitative content analysis seems appropriate since it implies the 
complete analysis of texts. Working with qualitative content analysis traditionally 
amounts to “coding”. These are “methods for finding and identifying key ideas in 
data; similar grouping types of information by category” (Rubin and Rubin 2003, 
65-66). A code is a word, a phrase that symbolically denotes the result or essence of 
the data (Saldana 2013, 3). However, it is vital to note that the coding depends solely 
on the interpretation of the author. Moreover, there are no strict rules as to which 
codes can be considered correct or not. Most importantly, the codes must correspond 
to the research questions. Mayring also speaks of encoding information (Mayring 
1994). He introduces the key concepts of qualitative analysis: 
1. Substantiation of the analyzed material (what material is the basis of the 
analysis?); 
2. Analysis of the situation in the data under study (by whom and under what 
circumstances was this material obtained?); 
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3. Formal characteristics of the material (in what form is this material 
presented?); 
4. Direction of analysis (what is at the center of the study?); 
5. Theoretical substantiation (theoretical substantiation of the questions asked 
by the researcher); 
6. Determination of analysis techniques and creation of an analysis model 
(analysis is carried out in specific steps, each of which can be checked and 
transferred to other objects under study); 
7. Determination of units of analysis. 
8. Analyzing by highlighting a system of categories: 
9. Testing the categorical system based on theory and empirical material 
10. Interpretation of the results 
11. Reference to a previously developed reliability criterion. 
In this thesis several paragraphs are of the main importance: the characteristics 
of the material, empirical material, and the interpretations of the results.  
It can be noted that qualitative content analysis opens the way to theoretical 
and methodological qualitative data assessment. Its aim is to substantiate hypotheses 
and discover new theories. It is not focused on establishing individual factors but is 
aimed at constructing possible relations between various elements. A particular 
advantage of this method is that it allows one to harmoniously combine both 
qualitative and quantitative indicators. This method allowed to compare the 
frequencies and the content of the references to the BEAR in official documents of 
the Russian Federation. It helped to understand the level of importance of the 
cooperation for the Russian authorities. Besides, this method will enable one to see 
the text's hidden content, which is not openly mentioned in the text but is present. 
By systematically assessing the text's meaningful meaning, it becomes possible not 
to reduce the text-only analysis to quantitative indicators. As a result, a theoretical 
study of the problem being examined becomes possible. This allows a clearer view 
of the interaction between theory and empirical material. Categories arise from a 
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specific text and develop further in the process of their assessment. (Kirpikov 2018, 
72).  
For the research, two large categories that helped classify Russia's project 
activities in the region were used. The first was the division into the state level of 
initiatives and the regional one. The second was the projects' division, where Russia 
was a direct organizer or initiator of cultural, scientific, and educational activities or 
just its participant. These categories helped to define Russia's role in the BEAR, and 
therefore the purpose of its activities in the organization and the region. 
 There were three main approaches to qualitative content analysis: 
conventional content analysis, directed content analysis, and summative content 
analysis (Hsieh & Shannon 2005, 67). In this work, a directed content analysis was 
mostly used. The guided content analysis focused on existing theory, which helped 
to create codes and categories in advance. This allowed predictions to be made 
considering the possibilities of category variation, the original coding scheme, and 
relations between codes. This approach was “referred to as deductive category 
application” (Mayring 2000, 81).  
Directed content analysis was applied to study the actors and their goals in 
promoting regional cultural cooperation. Thus, subcategories appear in the existing 
categories of the participant/organizer. The first is an exclusively institutional state 
level of cultural communication; the second is genuine and not declared participation 
in local communities. 
In this research, the following approach was followed. Firstly, I carefully 
studied Russia's official documents concerning foreign cultural policy, documents 
of the BEAC and the Barents Regional Council, paying particular attention to those 
related to cultural cooperation in the region and studying them using the qualitative 
content analysis process proposed by Mayring Philipp. The analysis of existing 
cultural and scientific projects in the BEAR was carried out the same way. In 




The comparison of those two categories was not the aim of the study itself but 
their analysis was essential for the understanding of the Russian policy in the region. 
The main assumption was that the regional/governmental level would show which 
part was mostly interested in the cooperation. Whereas the number of the organized 
projects would show the involvement into the cooperation.  
Comparative method was also used during the research in order to find the 
evolution of Russian role in the programs of the BEAR.  
 
1.3 Literature Review & Analysis of the Sources  
Researchers have often turned to the problems of Russia's Arctic agenda, the 
place of the Barents Euro-Arctic region in it, and a large number of studies devoted 
to the foreign cultural policy of Russia. However, there are currently no studies 
dedicated to the place of Russia's cultural policy in achieving strategic goals in the 
Arctic and even in a particular region. There are several correspondent researches 
on the Arctic strategy of Russia and on Russian cultural policy.  
The essence of the BEAR region from the Russian point of view was described 
in the book by Bulatov “The Barents Euro-Arctic Region: Past and Present”. It 
consistently pictured not only the history of the Region but political changes between 
the states which occupied the BEAR (Bulatov, 2006). Although there is no research 
on the Russian place in the BEAR from the cultural point of view, Porcel in his book 
“International relations in the Barents region” explained the reasons for the 
cooperation and the struggles Russia experiences because of this cooperation (Porcel 
2011). In 2016 the research “Euro-arctic region as Russia’s Arctic policy vector” by 
Kurylev and Petrova was published in which there was a discussion on the place of 
Russia in the region concerning the rice of interest towards Arctic. Most of the 
researches on the BEAR in Russia are regional and explore only the political and 
military parts leaving cultural impact behind. In this case the works of Lev 
Vostriakov on the cultural cooperation in the BEAR are highly important. His works 
explore the varieties of cultural cooperation in Russia and performed by Russia. 
Unfortunately, there are no assessments of the Russian role in the cultural exchange.  
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In north countries the BEAR as a scientific issue is more popular. In 2016 the 
“Encyclopedia of the Barents Region” was issued. Currently it is the most complete 
base of knowledge about the Barents region. As for the Arctic strategies of different 
countries including Russia, many studies can be mentioned. Lassi Heininen’s 
research named “Arctic strategies and policies” which explains the position of 
Russia and its role in the Arctic from the political point of view is the most complete 
comparative analysis for today. (Heininen 2012). “Russian strategies in the Arctic: 
Avoiding a new Cold War” by Heininen, Yarovoy and Sergunin written in 2014 is 
a research that helps to understand Russian position in different areas in the Arctic.  
The only research about the role of Russia and its cultural impact in the BEAR 
is “The role of Russia in regional councils a comparative study of neighborhood 
cooperation in the Baltic sea and Barents Euro-Arctic regions” by Oldberg written 
in 2014. The author suggests that difficulties in cultural cooperation are due to 
Russian special vision of the cultural influence from abroad (Oldberg 2014). 
Contrary to the Russian cultural role in the Arctic, Russian cultural policy is 
well analyzed in analyzed in the works of many Russian authors. Foreign cultural 
policy of the USSR and Russia: a comparative analysis gives an understanding of an 
essence and changes of Russian cultural diplomacy. “Formation and evolution of 
Russia's foreign cultural policy” by Bogolyubova determines the stages Russian 
cultural policy has gone through. In “Foreign cultural policy of Russia: historical 
experience and problems of the modern period” is stated that “Issues of foreign 
cultural policy of Russia again acquired strategic importance” (Bogolyubova 2013, 
146) and this idea is crucial for this thesis.  
 However, the primary sources of information for the thesis were Russia's 
official documents on foreign cultural policy, Russia's Arctic programs and 
programs of the BEAC, the BRC, The Joint Working Group on Culture (JWGC), 
numerous interviews and articles in the media. 
Several documents determine the foreign cultural policy of Russia. In April 
2000, the Concept of Foreign Cultural Policy was adopted. The document consists 
of eight sections reflecting a new look at the development of international cultural 
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cooperation in the country. According to the Concept, “cultural cooperation with 
foreign countries is one of the components in the system of foreign policy 
coordinates, along with economic and political interaction, and culture is one of the 
flexible, most effective levers in the complex mechanism of foreign policy” 
(Abstracts Foreign cultural policy of Russia - year 2000).  
The Concept defined the cooperation forms and directions. It suggested that 
further development of cultural, scientific, educational cooperation is necessary, as 
well as cooperation in mass media, libraries and archives, sports, youth exchange 
programs and so on. The document also outlined the critical role of bilateral 
cooperation with the crucial partners being, among others, the CIS and Baltic 
countries. A good illustration of the Concept 2000 relevance can be found at the turn 
of 20-21st centuries, when there was a spike of activity in BEAR countries cultural 
cooperation that aligns with the document contents. 
Large-scale cultural events in foreign countries are considered a good 
opportunity to spread culture and language of the organizing country, creating a 
positive public opinion of the country. Despite the effectiveness of such events, the 
Concept’s foreign cultural policy financing part was vague and unspecific, making 
the process of holding such events rather complicated. The research of the situation 
in the studied region at the time shows that for the most part, Russia was a country 
that didn’t direct finances to hold cultural events abroad, being more on a receiving 
side. 
In February 2001, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a 
document entitled “The Main Directions of the Work of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Development of Cultural Relations between 
Russia and Foreign Countries”. It supplemented and clarified the main provisions of 
the “Concept of Russia's Foreign Cultural Policy - The year 2000” (The main 
directions of work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 
the development of cultural ties between Russia and foreign countries 2001). 
The document defined the Russian Foreign Ministry cultural cooperation 
policy, stating the importance of cultural ties for the favorable public image of the 
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country. However, throughout the document one can trace a specific shift of focus 
from positive representation towards national interests realization, with the latter 
being outlined as related to the connection of diplomacy and culture in the history 
of Russia. Understanding this shift is crucial in the context of the research. 
The problems of Russia's international cooperation are defined in the 2008 
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. International Humanitarian 
Cooperation and Human Rights are presented in the Russian Federation's Priorities 
in Solving Global Problems section, which undoubtedly confirms the high 
importance of the cultural factor in the country's foreign policy. The Concept pays 
special attention to Russia's activities aimed at “protecting the rights and legitimate 
interests of Russian citizens and compatriots in expanding and strengthening the 
space of the Russian language and culture, preserving the ethnocultural identity of 
the Russian diaspora and its connection with the historical homeland” (Concept of 
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2008). However, the problem of 
insufficiently precise definitions and formulations regarding the financing of cultural 
policy remained. The content of the document is different from the “Concept of 
Foreign Cultural Policy of 2000”. The revision of 2008 already uses the concept of 
“soft power” directly, and it is applied in practice. 
In 2010, the following document was approved, complementing the scope of 
Russia's foreign cultural policy. Within the framework of the “Main directions of the 
policy of the Russian Federation in the field of international cultural and 
humanitarian cooperation” cooperation was recognized as “an integral part of the 
policy of the Russian state in the world arena” (Main directions of the policy of the 
Russian Federation in the field of international cultural and humanitarian 
cooperation). This fact is important in the context of the multitasking of Russian 
politics, since a separate and so precise definition made it possible to maintain 
Russia's contribution to international cultural exchange. Cultural diplomacy is seen 
as an important tool for strengthening the country's international authority. Thus, in 
the dissertation, cultural diplomacy is used as part of Russia's soft power, which is 
also used in the region under study. 
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The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation confirms the 
continuity of Russia's foreign policy in all key areas. International humanitarian 
cooperation is discussed in the section “Priorities of the Russian Federation in 
solving global problems”, which confirms the belief that the use of culture to achieve 
goals in the international arena is a priority for Russia. (Concept of foreign policy of 
the Russian Federation 2013). Cultural activities were aimed at creating a positive 
image of Russia abroad. The document showed the need to improve the system of 
using “soft power”, which is understood as “a comprehensive toolkit for solving 
foreign policy problems based on the capabilities of civil society, information and 
communication, humanitarian and other methods and technologies, alternative to 
classical diplomacy” (Sovetnikova 2014, 153-155). However, as in the previous 
edition, the document under consideration does not spell out a clear mechanism for 
financing the international cultural activities of the Russian state, which, of course, 
remains the main problem that hinders the holding of large-scale cultural events. 
The 2016 Russian Foreign Policy Concept has changed a lot from the 2013 
model. In the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, issues related to the sphere of culture 
are given, in general, much more attention than in previously adopted similar 
documents. So, as an objective factor to be considered, the growth of the diversity 
of cultures and civilizations globally, the multiplicity of development models is 
noted, the priority of preventing inter-civilizational faults, the formation of 
intercultural and inter-civilizational partnership is substantiated. It is noted that 
Russia, as a multinational and multi-confessional state with centuries-old experience 
of harmonious coexistence of different peoples, consistently advocates a decrease in 
the role of the factor of force in international relations while simultaneously 
strengthening strategic and regional stability. (Foreign policy concept of the Russian 
Federation 2016). In this edition, state tasks in the international cultural sphere were 
determined. For example, to the important tasks are added: “the development of 
interstate cultural and humanitarian ties of the Slavic peoples; work to create a 
positive image of Russia, guided by the authority of its culture, education, science 




Simultaneously, clause 71 of the “Regional priorities of the foreign policy of 
the Russian Federation” separately indicates the importance of cooperation between 
the countries of the “Northern Dimension”, which includes the studied region. 
Unfortunately, the document no longer mentions scientific and cultural cooperation 
in general as a priority, but indigenous peoples' environmental aspects and interests 
are now a priority. In general, this fully corresponds to the position of Russia in the 
BEAR and in the region itself since 2016, when a decline in cultural cooperation is 
already noticeable in terms of creative teams, scientific research, exchanges, and 
projects to preserve the identity of the peoples inhabiting the Barents region come 
to the fore. This also indirectly shows the beginning of Russia's closeness from 
Western colleagues and the desire to strengthen the protection of the country's 
national interests, rather than the development of free exchange of information and 
culture. “Russia believes that the Arctic states bear a special responsibility for the 
sustainable development of the region, and in this regard, stands for strengthening 
interaction in the format of the Arctic Council, the Arctic coastal five, as well as the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Russia will firmly oppose any attempts to bring 
elements of a policy of confrontation and military confrontation to the Arctic, 
politicize international interaction in the region” (Ibid.). 
The next essential sources that made it possible to determine Russia's goals in 
the Arctic region, to which the Barents region belongs, are the Arctic strategies of 
the Russian Federation. 
On September 18, 2009, President Medvedev approved the Fundamentals of 
State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and 
Beyond. This six-page document lists Russia's national interests in the region: 
developing Arctic resources, using the Northern Sea Route as a national unified 
transport communication, and preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace and 
cooperation. It focuses on the strategic importance of the Arctic for Russia 
(Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the 
period up to 2020 and beyond).  
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On February 20, 2013, President Vladimir Putin approved a document entitled 
“Development Strategy for the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation”. It should be 
noted that this document cannot be considered a comprehensive Russian doctrine 
regarding the Arctic. It covers only the Russian Arctic and not the Arctic region as 
a whole. In this sense, it can be put in line with the Canadian and Norwegian 
strategies to develop the northern territories. The 2013 Strategy also has 
international dimensions, including, for example, the position in which Russia 
indicates the need for international cooperation in such areas as exploration and 
development of natural resources, environmental protection, preservation of 
traditional lifestyles, and ensuring the ethnocultural development of the indigenous 
population of the Arctic. I consider it important to note that it follows from the 
document that Russia does not have the resources and technologies for independent 
development of the Russian Arctic's natural resources. For the development of the 
Far North, it needs foreign investment and high technologies. Of course, cultural 
cooperation in the Arctic strategy appears indirectly; however, even in an internal 
document, the need for foreign investment at the first stages of implementing the 
Arctic agenda shows the importance of communication with foreign colleagues. The 
2013 Concept does not pay special attention to Russia's national interests in the 
Arctic, but it can be concluded that they do not differ from the national interests set 
in 2009 (Ibid.). 
As shown by the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the 
Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the Period up to 2035, 
adopted in October 2020, the policy is being refined in certain areas. This also 
applies to the region under study and directly to cultural communication. The 
document has some interesting intersections with the 2016 Concept. For example, 
as already mentioned, in the 2016 Foreign Cultural Policy Concept, an important 
place was allocated to indigenous peoples and their place in international scientific 
and cultural exchanges. The 2020 Strategy confirms this thesis and highlights not 
the inhabitants of the Arctic zone but the representatives of the indigenous 
minorities. This is also declared as one of the main directions in ensuring the 
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effective work of the Arctic Council under the chairmanship of the Russian 
Federation in 2021-2023: “... promoting joint projects, including those aimed at 
ensuring sustainable development of the Arctic and preserving the cultural heritage 
of indigenous peoples” (Presidential decree On the Strategy for the Development of 
the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security for the 
Period up to 2035, 2020).  
In the 2020 Strategy, a little attention was paid to cultural cooperation between 
the Arctic countries. It declared support and assistance in strengthening ties between 
indigenous peoples living in the Arctic zone and indigenous peoples living in foreign 
states' Arctic territories. It also held relevant international forums, and the main 
emphasis was on educational, humanitarian, and cultural exchanges with young 
people from other Arctic states (Ibid.). At the same time, there was no mention of 
the separate status or special significance of the Barents region or its inhabitants, 
which showed that it was not the highest priority in the context of the Russian Arctic 
agenda.  
Thanks to the Concepts of Russia's Foreign Policy and its Arctic Strategies, it 
was possible to trace what goals Russia pursues at the state level in the Arctic 
regions, including the Barents region. The mention of the Council of the Barents 
Region in the mid-2000s and its subsequent exclusion from the program documents 
showed a change in the landmarks of Russia and its national interests even in the 
context of cultural cooperation, and the reorientation of humanitarian cooperation 
from universal (residents of the region) to specialized (only indigenous peoples) 
indicated the beginning of a certain closedness of the exchange of cultural 
information, unwillingness to large-scale cooperation, exchange of information and 
the possibility of constructing a common identity of the region based on culture. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
The thesis consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, and 
references. The research questions and a brief overview of the theme are given in 
the introduction, as well as the description of methodology and a literature review.  
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The second chapter describes the theoretical basis of the research, refers to the 
definition of «soft power» and “cultural diplomacy”. This chapter defines the role 
of foreign cultural cooperation in Russia.  
The third chapter is the case study. It divides the parts according to the decades 
and Cultural programs executed during this period. The first section is devoted to 
the creation of the Barents cooperation and the role of Russia in it. In the second 
one, I describe the first three Cultural programs of the Barents region and define 
Russia's transitional role in the cooperation. The third one is about the turning point 
in Russian foreign policy and its current state.  
The fourth chapter is a futurological discussion that presents two possible 
scenarios of the Barents region's events after the COVID-19. 
The final part of the study is the conclusion, which summarizes the results of 




2. THEORETICAL SUBSTANTIATION OF RUSSIA'S POSITION IN 
FOREIGN CULTURAL POLICY 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region is among the economically developed 
regions. A unique culture develops in the region as well as local traditions are 
carefully preserved. The cooperation of the countries which belong to this region is 
long-term and productive. In this case, I should explain what I mean by using the 
term “region”. John A. Agnew noted that international relations researchers often 
use the term “region” either to “group of nations that appear to be similar and thus 
simplify greater complexity” or to place research IR to a “meso-regional area” that 
is larger than national and more diminutive than international (Agnew 2013, 6). 
Thus, in the BEAR case, we are dealing with an association on a territorial basis, 
which can develop into an association with a constructed identity, including through 
cultural communication. The Russian Federation is contributing to the development 
of these relations. It is one of many actors of the region which creates the region's 
general cultural policy by applying its cultural strategies and forms the 
representation in this political arena for non-cultural steps. 
In order to explain the position of the Russian Federation on issues of cultural 
cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, I will consider this thesis from the 
standpoint of «soft power» and goals which the Russian Federation pursues by 
implementing soft power to protect its national interests. Another essential 
theoretical framework is cultural diplomacy and its implementation in terms of 
Russian External Cultural Policy.  
2.1 The understanding of Soft power in Russia and its protection of national 
interests 
The concept of soft power appeared, among other things, due to the beginning 
of the information age (Nye J. 1990, 23). This happened due to the blurring of 
boundaries between domestic and foreign policy of the state. This has become a 
natural consequence of globalization. J. Nye suggested considering the resources 
available in the arsenal of "soft power" when shaping the foreign policy course. He 
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believed that a positive image, states can win over others, can be a more effective 
instrument of influence than "hard power" associated with the use of military force 
and instruments of coercion (Nye J. 2004, 23). 
In this case, soft power is expressed in “the ability to achieve what we want 
to be based on the voluntary participation of allies, and not through coercion and 
handouts” (Ibid., 15). According to the author, the first most crucial resource of 
states is culture; the second is a set of political values; the third is the state's foreign 
policy (Ibid., 11). As the researcher Korotina notes, these are all those numerous 
intangible assets that can increase the attractiveness of a country in the eyes of the 
rest of the world and expand the possibilities of their owner to influence and promote 
their interests (Korotina 2014, 50).  
From the moment of its first use to the present day, the concept of soft power 
has undergone some changes. It happened mainly due to the fact that scientists could 
not single out the definition that would satisfy everyone. Matveenko and Galayeva 
claim that in the modern world, soft power can be considered a special kind of 
management policy, which is aimed at using non-violent methods of influence, tools, 
and technology to achieve their geostrategic goals (Matveenko and Galaeva 2015, 
52). On the other hand, Soft power is one of the forms of the state's foreign policy 
strategy, as well as a complex mechanism of influence through a system of 
“attractive preferences” a set of political, technological techniques, methods and 
means” (Budaev, 2014, 15). Former head of the Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo 
understood soft power as “civil society, its institutions, and structures that are also 
capable of shaping the foreign policy of the state” (Kosachev, K. 2015).  
Following J. Nye's concept, “soft power has two sources - internal (the 
attractiveness of the model of the country's socio-economic development) and 
external (the instruments of “soft power” of the state are addressed to other countries 
and have an impact on public opinion)” (Nye J. 2004, 13). Politics' success was 
ensured only when “behind the back of American diplomacy there was the shadow 
of the US and NATO armed forces” as it was noted by Sicherman (Sicherman 1997, 
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13-14). Later this opinion was supplemented by Ferguson. He compared “soft 
power” with imperialism, which can only be driven by “hard power”. He believed 
that the significance of J. Nye's concept was exaggerated, and only the described 
methods were not enough in practice. “Soft power is just a velvet glove that hides 
an iron hand” (Ferguson 2004, 26). This point is close to the most common 
perception of soft power in the Russian government. As the Barents Euro-Arctic 
region has high military importance, all soft power work here reflects security.   
Knight argues that at the heart of any force, be it “soft” or “hard”, there are 
own interests (Knight 2014, 237). National interest is a crucial element in the system 
of modern international relations. The national interest expresses the primary vital 
needs for the nation's survival and preservation and the state. “National interests are 
an open declaration of the state's needs and intentions, based on an assessment of the 
current situation”, and such a declaration fulfills several important functions in the 
country's life (Troitsky 2015).  
To determine the role of national interest in modern international relations, it 
is necessary to refer to existing fundamental theories. As Savelyeva writes in her 
article «The evolution of the use of the term “interest” in the theory of international 
relations”, there are three main paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism 
(Savelyeva 2011, 34). In realism and neo-realism, national interest is based on the 
state's geographic location, economic, cultural, and political development. Interest 
is a stable and almost unchanging category; it can be changed only due to a change 
by the state of its geographical position on the world map. Theorists and practitioners 
of liberalism in some way recognize the existence of “national interest”, but on the 
condition that moral norms and global problems are included in this concept. The 
main idea here is that some actors' preferences or their interests change under the 
influence of others' preferences and do not remain unchanged. It is worth paying 
attention to social constructivism. Supporters of this idea insist that their 
implementation's interests and methods are a social phenomenon constructed by 
society and implemented by it. Thus, interests are based on collective ideas kept in 
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contracts and practices. Constructivists believe that the world is ruled by ideas, the 
source of which is people. 
Thus, in a narrow sense for any state, it is customary to understand the national 
interest as a set of measures to protect the state's territorial integrity, sovereignty, 
and independence, its main institutions of government. Whereas in a broad sense, 
national interest affects several additional areas of activity, including: “protection of 
the life and property of its citizens abroad, protectionism concerning the national 
economy, as well as the prestige of the state in the international arena, protection 
concerning the traditional way of life, culture, etc.” (Alekseeva 1997, 89).  
Various technologies can be used to implement soft power as a tool to advance 
their national interests. There are two ways of influencing soft power, direct and 
indirect. The direct influence model assumes that leaders of states change the 
direction of their policies under the influence of other leaders' beliefs and the 
attractiveness of their values and attitudes. When operated indirectly, soft power 
tools aim to change public opinion and third party's opinion, which, in turn, influence 
the decisions made by political leaders. Various instruments are used in the 
implementation of soft power. The main tools of soft power include cultural 
diplomacy; folk culture; education system and student exchanges; information 
flows; the ability to wage information wars; positioning the country in the global 
hierarchy; political PR aimed at foreign audiences; global marketing; the language 
of the country and the degree of its popularity in the world; migration policy; 
tourism, sports, and cultural exchanges; national diaspora (Nye J. 2007, 163).  
 Soft power can have a significant impact on ensuring the national security of 
the Russian Federation. Therefore, it is important to find out the very mechanism of 
such influence. It is important to highlight that soft power is a resource of our foreign 
policy, promoting our national interests, creating a positive image in the foreign 
policy sphere (Bydaev, 2015, 84). In this context, it is important to identify the 
positive aspects, identify the challenges and threats from foreign policy actors to 
national interests, and outline their priorities. The main criterion for the correct 
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choice of the strategy for the implementation of soft power should be its compliance 
with the country's national interests. Their correct definition is a key task of any state 
and public institution (Gacko, 2016). 
The soft power policy is an established vector of the state's foreign policy 
development. Although Russia is experiencing a shortage of soft power, it uses the 
instruments of its influence in different regions of the world but with varying degrees 
of effectiveness. The previous studies confirm that Russia perceived term “power” 
mostly in a military way (Forsberg 2013). Currently, the process of expanding the 
arsenal of soft power is underway, primarily in priority regions. The BEAR was 
highlighted even in the Foreign policy concept 2008. Since then, the attitude and use 
of soft power in this region have changed, and now it is reflected in national 
documents.  
The concept of soft power was included in the Foreign Policy Concept of the 
Russian Federation in 2013 and then in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept (Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016). The most common understanding 
of soft power and dominance in Russia is non-military methods of influencing the 
opposite side. With this approach, economic and political coercion, as well as its 
other types, fall under the definition of soft power. However, as Tsygankov writes, 
“Russian understanding of interest in the problem of soft power has a different 
chronology and nature, only partly repeating the foreign intellectual history of the 
concept” (Tsygankov 2013). The first attempts to actively implement soft power 
policies were at the beginning of Medvedev's presidential term. In 2012, an article 
by the presidential candidate Putin was published. For the first time, the political 
elite analyzed and introduced the term soft politics from the perspective of Russian 
national interests (Putin 2012). It described in detail what Russia's national interests 
were and how the Russian Federation could contribute to spreading its values. There 
was also a difference in the Russian side's approaches and, for example, the 
American side. «It is noteworthy that the article describes the instruments of “soft 
power” as “illegal” (Tsygankov 2013). 
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Putin’s statement contained in the program article was named “Russia and the 
Changing World”. It was stated that “soft power” was a set of tools and methods to 
achieve foreign policy goals without the use of weapons, but through information 
and other levers of influence, it reflects the specifics of the domestic approach to the 
interpretation of “soft power” (Putin 2012). Subsequently, the instrumental approach 
was enshrined in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, where “soft power” was defined 
as “a comprehensive toolkit for solving foreign policy problems based on the 
capabilities of civil society, information and communication, humanitarian and other 
methods and technologies alternative to classical diplomacy” (Ibid.). Thus, “soft 
power” is viewed as an instrument of geopolitical confrontation because the above-
mentioned perception includes instruments from simple image influence to open 
propaganda. 
Based on the scientific literature and Russian reality, one can conclude that 
understanding the essence of soft power is somewhat different from the generally 
accepted one. Russian strategic planning documents that define the basic principles, 
priorities, goals, and objectives in foreign policy and national security contain 
repeated indications of the importance of soft power and indicate the need to 
strengthen Russia's role in the global humanitarian space. (National Security 
Strategy of the Russian Federation 2015). 
At the same time, none of these documents discloses the reason for such close 
attention to these issues. Besides, none of the strategic planning documents reveals 
the concept of a humanitarian space, where the strengthening of Russia's role should 
take place, and humanitarianism is reduced to issues of culture, the Russian 
language, and relations with compatriots. Moreover, the definition of soft power 
generally dropped out of the latest version of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept. 
The current Foreign Policy Concept declares “humanitarian technologies” as an 
instrument of soft power, which is “an integral part of modern international politics” 
allows to assert that humanitarian activity is nevertheless viewed as an instrument 
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for promoting Russia's soft power (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Federation 2016). 
Russia does not abandon the concept of soft power. Based on the Concepts, it 
can be traced how since 2000 “soft power” or «the desire to spread a positive image” 
(Abstracts Foreign cultural policy of Russia - year 2000 2000, 74-86) transformed 
from the point of view of Russia to 2016. In my opinion, this only confirms Russia's 
use of soft power and, in general, cultural policy in terms of upholding national 
interests. Indeed, the understanding of soft power mechanisms by Russia and other 
states differs, as well as the set of tools used to promote a country abroad.  
Does Russia use the concept of soft power? Yes, but not at maximum adapted 
it to the needs of the country. Does it use it successfully? It is rather a matter of 
image and representation. According to various polls, Russia's image and the degree 
of trust (which is included in the rating of the use of soft power) is relatively low. 
In contrast, according to the same statistics, the country's recognition and the 
use of the Russian language are high. “Other than in Russia, the Russian language 
was widely spoken in CIS countries by over 79 million people in 2019. Furthermore, 
more than 13 million residents of Eastern European and Balkan countries were 
Russian speakers. Russian was the eighth most widely spoken language 
worldwide as of 2019” (Geographical distribution of the Russian-speaking 
population 2019). Accordingly, it turns out that, for example, Russia's Foreign 
Cultural Policy's goal to preserve and popularize the Russian language is achievable 
and Russia's soft policy, enshrined at the state level, works. Perhaps, if the foreign 
policy priorities had not changed, then other objectives of the soft policy would have 
been achieved. 
2.2 “Cultural diplomacy” as part of soft power and Russian foreign 
cultural policy 
The concept of “cultural diplomacy” is primarily a demonstration of national 
power, as it reveals every aspect of the culture. It also demonstrates competitiveness 
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in everything from sports to industry to military power and the general confidence 
of the nation” (Waller 2009, 76). All implemented strategies should guarantee the 
security of the nation. Although the power is “soft” the main aim, as it was 
mentioned, is to follow national interests. In this case, cultural diplomacy is the main 
tool. 
Cultural diplomacy can be seen as a component of public diplomacy. Public 
diplomacy helps to “amplify and advertise that society and culture to the world at 
large” (Lord 2006, 15). This means that culture can become the component of public 
diplomacy if there is already a relationship that relayed the information. According 
to Lord (Ibid. 25), this comes from knowledge of the other's culture. Frederic 
supposes that “public diplomacy covers undertakings aimed at (recipients) abroad in 
the fields of information, education and culture, the aim of which is to influence a 
foreign government by influencing its citizens. (Frederic 1993, 62). Haigh claims 
that “cultural diplomacy has its roots in cultural relations” (Haigh 1974, 23). 
According to Taylor “the primary instruments of Cultural Diplomacy are language 
teaching, educational exchanges, exhibitions”.  (Taylor 2007, 79). He also promoted 
the idea that it is political activity under cover of culture which defend national 
interests. (Ibid.,90) In Russia's case, this role takes Russian cultural centers abroad. 
The international exhibition Rossotrudnichestvo is one example of the main Russian 
center's activities aimed at cultural diplomacy. Recently it organized the round table 
“For Knowledge to Russia”, which presents the international project of internships 
with the prospect of employment in the Barents Region “BRIDGE” (MASU 2020). 
Waller claims that “cultural diplomacy can only occur when formal diplomats, 
serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance 
national interests” (Waller 2008, 74-75). However, while cultural diplomacy is 
primarily a government activity, it should not be forgotten that the private sector also 
plays an important role in culture. The government cannot create culture, society 
creates it. It can frustrate and direct it, as well as determine its influence on national 
politics. “While cultural diplomacy endeavors to manage the international 
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environment, using these sources and achievements, making them known abroad” 
(Cull 2008, 33).   
Cultural diplomacy as soft power is usually seen as a weapon to gain soft 
control over another nation by applying a non-violent means to promote 
relationships, engender mutual understanding, and claim support. The purpose of 
promoting cultural diplomacy is ultimately perceived as the goal to influence a 
foreign audience and utilize the influence that is built up over a long period. 
According to Waller, the main purpose of cultural diplomacy is “to harness the 
elements of culture to induce foreigners to have a positive view of 
The country's people, culture and policies” (Waller 2009, 77). It is also used «to 
induce greater cooperation between the two nations, aid in changing the policies or 
political environment of the target nation, prevent, manage and mitigate conflict with 
the target nation (Waller 2009, 77). In other words, cultural diplomacy is supposed 
to be a way of conducting international relations without expecting anything in 
return in the way that traditional diplomacy typically expects. This seems different 
from the understanding of soft power in support of national interests. But if one is 
trying to create a positive view of the country's people, that can be in the national 
interests and be more than “not expecting anything in return”. This is precisely what 
a state uses in international policy. It may be even more successful than declaring 
interests out loud and demanding a special attitude at once in the long term. 
Generally, cultural diplomacy is more focused on longer-term and less on 
specific policy matters (Lord 2006, 30). The obvious intent of using cultural 
diplomacy for particular policy-related issues is to build up influence over the long 
term when needed by engaging people directly. 
This influence has implications that range from national security to increasing 
tourism and commercial opportunities (Leonard 2002, 51). This has allowed the 
government to create a foundation of trust and a mutual understanding that is neutral 
and built on people-to-people contact (Leonard 2002, 51).  
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One should note the important unique element that is seen in cultural 
diplomacy. It is the ability to reach youth, non-elites, and other audiences outside of 
the traditional embassy area (Kashirina and Fedotova 2017).  
Russian researchers consider cultural diplomacy to be an integral part of the 
state's “soft power” policy (Vasilenko 2016, 73). 
Not so long ago, the weight and influence of cultural diplomacy had grown so 
much that a new concept of “foreign cultural policy” was introduced in Russia. In 
2001, the first fundamental conceptual document dedicated to cultural diplomacy 
was presented. In the “Main directions of the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation on the development of cultural ties between Russia and 
foreign countries”, it was said that the main task of Russia's foreign cultural policy 
was the formation and strengthening of “mutual understanding and trust with foreign 
countries, the development of an equal and mutually beneficial partnership with 
them” (Ibid.) in the system of international cultural cooperation. Moreover, cultural 
ties, which are one of the most “flexible and effective tools in the mechanism of 
foreign policy, are called upon to work to create a favorable and objective image of 
Russia in the world” (Ibid.) 
Thus, cultural diplomacy combines the state's policy concerning certain areas 
of cultural activity, the culture of foreign policy, and the instrumental use of culture 
and cultural norms in foreign policy. It helps diplomatic activity to overcome 
cultural barriers. The instruments of cultural influence included in the concept of 
cultural diplomacy involve the use of various factors such as art, science and 
education to protect and promote the national interests of the state in the international 
arena. 
To sum up, it is possible to say that Russia's foreign cultural policy is declared 
in the Foreign policy concepts of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, even the 
above-mentioned Concepts do not observe problem fully and define a path for 
Russian cultural policy. The relations in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region are not 
regulated by Concepts other than the main one. The disappearance of mentioning of 
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the BEAR/BEAC from the Concepts 2016 shows the decline of interest in the region 
on the governmental level.  
Soft power as a part of Russian cultural policy is used in governmental and 
scientific documents. Still, the data shows that its understanding, and the essence 
differs from the worldwide standard. Soft power is used not for external influence 
and making a good image but for maintaining national interests secured. As the 
BEAR situation shows, Russian governmental and cultural policy has transformed 
from the openness of opinions and culture exchange in the 90s to the high concern 
of soft power other than national interests in the mid-10s. 
The cultural diplomacy policy is an instrument of Russian cultural policy, and 
this is precisely what Russia uses to influence in the international arena. Cultural 
diplomacy is also used to protect national interests, but according to the data above, 




3. RUSSIAN ROLE IN CURRENT CULTURAL COOPERATION IN THE 
BARENTS REGION  
This chapter focuses on the background and history of the BEAR. I believe 
that it is the purpose of the organization that shapes its further existence; therefore, 
today, it is necessary to understand the reason for the BEAC creation. One needs to 
understand that the region under the BEAC is a forum for resolving economic, 
social, cultural, and sometimes even articulating political issues. Next, we must trace 
how the main goals and objectives of the organization have changed. For this, we 
proceed to the program documents. The second question this chapter answer is the 
definition of Russia's role in the BEAR's creation. This part closely intersects with 
the problems of the organization's general goals and objectives; however, I dwell in 
more detail on the reasons and perspectives for Russia.  
The main idea for this chapter is the case analysis itself. I try to answer the 
main question of the thesis about the role of Russia in the region according to its 
participation in cultural projects. I also seek an answer to the question on the 
purposes of Russian cultural policy in the Arctic region.  
3.1 The Barents Euro-Arctic Region: background and the aims of creation 
The BEAR international organization was created in 1993. At the same time, 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council was founded by signing the Kirkenes Declaration 
on January 11, 1993. Now the organization unites nine regions of Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and five constituent entities of the Russian Federation: Arkhangelsk and 
Murmansk regions, Nenets Autonomous District, the Republic of Komi, and 
Karelia. Iceland and Denmark also participate in the BEAR, although they are not 
active participants in the programs. The organization's uniqueness is its structure: 
interaction is carried out between governments and at the level of administrative-
territorial entities within the scope of the Barents Regional Council. It is important 
to note that fourteen Working Groups organize functional interaction in the Barents 
Region. The Working Groups are divided into BEAC Working Groups, BRC 
Working Groups, Joint Working Groups, and the Working Group of Indigenous 
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Peoples. Thus, the cooperation areas embrace such spheres as rescue cooperation, 
environment, investments economic cooperation, transport and logistics, culture, 
education, energy, health and social issues, tourism, youth, and indigenous peoples 
(The Barents Euro-Arctic Council). This makes it possible to optimally combine 
states' priorities with the needs of individual regions in the interests of the people 
living there (The Norwegian Barents Secretariat). However, as practice shows, 
such regional organizations do not always work optimally. For example, there is a 
serious problem of environmental safety and illegal migration in the Barents 
region. These problems cannot be solved solely through regional cooperation. Most 
of the issues are resolved only at the state level. 
Returning to the reasons behind the formation of the BEAR, it is worth 
noting that for the post-Cold War northern Europe, such an opinion was quite a 
logical and characteristic continuation of the foreign policy line. (Svensson, 1998) 
After the end of the Cold War, Western countries, particularly the Nordic countries, 
felt the need for a platform for cooperation not only among themselves but also 
with the Russian Federation's participation. (Aalto, 2006) This policy's specific 
goal was to resolve possible conflicts and bridge the gap between West and East 
through cooperation and joint development (The Barents Euro-Arctic Region). The 
same was mentioned in the main documents of the organization. The Kirkenes 
Declaration of 1993 states that the cooperation is “to decrease the tension and 
increase the region's stability” (Kirkenes Declaration 1993, 1). 
Mikhail Gorbachev was one of the first to initiate cooperation in BEAR in 
Murmansk's speech on October 1, 1987. The proposal to formalize cooperation 
within the BEAR was put forward in 1992 by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Norway, Turvadd Stoltenberg (Gorbachev 1987). 
The reason for such an initiative was obvious. The Arctic has a special place 
in Russia's foreign policy agenda. It is also a promising economic region full of 
natural resources. In terms of its physical and geographical characteristics, the 
Euro-Arctic zone seems to be promising for the development of both cross-border 
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infrastructure projects and the oil and gas cluster of the extractive industry.  
Unfortunately, not every project on oil infrastructure succeeded. On the other hand, 
the security of Russian Arctic zone is highly important for the state. Technical 
equipment of the Northern Fleet and its military maneuvers shows the strategic 
importance of the Arctic. Thus, the development of the Euro-Arctic direction can 
be named an objective response to the challenges of the time and a strategic 
decision to ensure Russia's national interests. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council has 
become a platform for the development of such cooperation. Its creation was 
expected due to the need for a platform for policy coordination between countries 
and their regions. This required a political necessity, which was felt both by Russia 
and by the European Union.  
It is worth noting that this structure was created on the initiative of Norway 
and Russia. It was Russian-Norwegian cooperation that was fundamental for the 
entire international organization. The development of partnership relations 
between these countries is developing today and has prospects for the future. Yet, 
some of the older cooperation does not continue, and the relations are not 
unproblematic.  
Norwegian political scientist Honneland stated that the project was aimed at 
“reducing military tensions, environmental threats and the gap between East and 
West in the standard of living in the region” (Honneland 1998, 2). This statement 
is essential because, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was still 
perceived in Europe as a potential threat, so the goal was to create a new kind of 
organization for multilateral and bilateral cooperation to build mutual trust 
(Heininen and Lomagin, 2016, 270). The intention was to stimulate and facilitate 
long-term joint action that would ultimately benefit the region's entire population. 
The creators also hoped that the agreement would lead to the opening of the 
previously closed East-West border and better understand living conditions and 
close cooperation of people from the same region but living in different countries 
(Stoltenberg and Gorbachev 2016, 17-20).  
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In general, by the beginning of the 90s, the development of international 
multi-level platforms for dialogue became both a trend of the times and a necessity. 
On the one hand, the countries of the former USSR were striving for independence. 
On the other hand, the countries of northern Europe wanted protection from any 
outside threat and political stability. According to some political scientists, the 
BEAR formation would be impossible without those processes (Elenius 2015, 
470). Thus, time and some degree of populism influenced the creation of this 
organization: “the project was linked to the overall regionalization process 
underway in Europe as well as in the Arctic, turning previously peripheral border 
areas into meeting places between states in transnational networking involving 
many-sided interaction” (Honneland, 1998, 15). 
One more reason for establishing Barents cooperation, which was especially 
significant for Norway, was that due to the geographic factors, Norway was 
excluded from the Baltic region's cooperation. Thus, not least because of “fear of 
losing its say in the making of Northern European security policy”, Norway was 
primed to organize a political project to play one of the leading roles (Honneland 
1998; Svensson 1998). Although the project was based on bilateral Russian-
Norwegian relations, it initially met with skepticism and resistance both from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the central office of Norway, and the Russian 
military and security services (Heininen and Lomagin 2016, 270). However, later, 
the idea of a joint platform for resolving possible conflict situations and the 
potential for reducing military tensions defeated doubts.  
The main provisions of the BEAR, formulated by the Barents Regional 
Council, are improvement of living conditions, sustainable socio-economic 
development, peaceful and sustainable development of the northernmost regions of 
Europe, the well-being of people living in the Barents region. Moreover, the 
expansion of interethnic cooperation in all areas remains the main achievement and 
the primary tool of strengthening interaction. All participants strive to preserve the 
culture, customs, and way of life of the indigenous peoples of the region. 
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However, not all researchers believe that the structure works as declared. 
Some point out that while leading the BEAC, countries are primarily driven not by 
the common good but by their own interests (Bailes and Ólafsson 2017, 53). Critics 
also note that many problems, such as transport accessibility, have not been solved 
for decades (The Norwegian Barents Secretariat), and the number of environmental 
issues, despite the declarations and statements of countries about environmental 
protection, do not diminish (WWF 2018).  Russian scientists also note 
disappointing data on the region's depopulation despite the efforts declared in many 
documents (Popova and Vicentiy 2019). 
Over two decades of cooperation, a stable administrative regional 
infrastructure has been formed, making it possible to manage the implementation 
of projects under the Barents Program effectively. To coordinate projects of 
cultural cooperation, a committee of heads of cultural bodies was created. Initially, 
this body was called the Committee on Culture (1993-2001). Later it was renamed 
into the Barents Regional Working Group on Culture under the auspices of the 
Barents Regional Council (2001-2007). Currently, it is called the “Joint Working 
Group of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council on culture”. 
It should be noted that cultural cooperation in the North of Europe has so far 
been distinguished mainly by an extensive expansion of culture within the Barents 
region, often due to language barriers. However, at the same time, strong ties are 
being established between the various groups of indigenous peoples and peoples 
inhabiting the region. The Barents Regional Council uses its political influence to 
raise awareness among people living in the region and to promote the interests of 
the Barents population at the national, European, and international levels (Cultural 
Cooperation in the Barents Region 2014-2018). 
Now let us turn to the BEAR's policy documents for recent years to 
understand how the region's development goals and objectives were set.  
35 
 
Particular attention will be paid to the analysis of cultural cooperation and 
programs between the participants. A great impulse to cooperate in the field of 
culture was given by meeting the ministers of culture on August 31 - September 1, 
1993. With a joint declaration, the ministers of culture emphasized their intentions 
to encourage the development of cultural exchange, contributing to the expansion 
of knowledge about culture and society, to take care of ancient monuments, to 
prevent the destruction of common irreplaceable values. In Kirkenes the main 
objectives of cultural cooperation were decided. Among them one of the main 
problem was described as a “formation of a single identity, strengthening the sense 
of belonging to their nations and the BEAR as a whole” (Kirkenes Declaration 
1993).The representation of the BEAR as a powerful cultural center in Europe with 
the help of joining efforts in cultural cooperation was also claimed to be an 
important part of the BEAR (Ibid.). One of the main strategic goals for all its 
participants of the BEAR cooperation program is to put cultural ties at the 
provincial level, bypassing the capital. Another equally crucial strategic goal is to 
oppose the Americanization of the culture of Northern Europe. (The Barents Euro-
Arctic Council) 
The first Barents program was already developed in 1994. Together with the 
BRC, the Barents Secretariat was delegated the authority to greenlight the projects. 
The main focus was on ensuring that projects receive multilateral funding. The 
working group on culture developed specific measures that were included in the 
Barents Program for 1994-1995. in the following nine areas: 
 1. Environmental challenges are a cultural issue; 
 2. Film and TV; 
3. Training of managers; 




6. Annual festivals in each subject; 
7. Pre-project of the Sami cultural center in Lovozero (Murmansk region); 
8. Pre-project of the Nenets ethnic center; 
9. Church contacts. 
The second Barents program's next step was creating an extensive database 
of multilateral projects funded by Norway, Finland, and Sweden. By 1996, the 
Council had established several key programs for the development of the region. 
These include INTERREG and TACIS (Fokin and Smirnov 2012). 
These were the original goals of the BEAC. Now let us turn to more modern 
projects. The Barents Program 2014 - 2018 is the seventh Barents Program since 
the signing of the Kirkenes Declaration in 1993. One should note that every two 
years chair country presents its own program which usually follows the main idea 
of the Council’s program. The program aims to find solutions to common problems 
and to define a common framework for cooperation in the region (Cultural 
Cooperation in the Barents Region 2014-2018). There are several common regional 
development goals for all 13 members of the Barents Region. First, there is a 
demographic problem throughout the region, a high unemployment level, 
especially among young people.  
Therefore, the first challenge is to attract a skilled workforce and improve 
skills by providing education and training throughout an active life. This issue is of 
great importance for the entire Barents region and can be resolved based on 
multilateral cooperation. The second most crucial issue is the use of business 
opportunities. The third essential component of regional development is the 
environment. It is necessary to create attractive living conditions, take measures to 
preserve the ecology and a favorable environment, ensure a high quality of life, and 
attract the region's population, especially young people and women. 
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Cultural cooperation in 2014-2018 aimed to attract tourists, investments and 
develop the BEAR countries' attractiveness. The increase in the importance of 
cooperation in the field of innovation and scientific research can be indirectly 
attributed to this. In this regard, the INTERREG Nord and Horizon 2020 programs 
can be singled out. The Horizon 2020 program is focused on such key priorities as 
the science of high achievements, industrial leadership, and social challenges. For 
the Barents Region, such an area as high-performance science provides additional 
opportunities for attracting funding; for example, funding opportunities for 
mobility programs involving scientists from universities in the Barents Region 
(Cultural Cooperation in the Barents Region 2014-2018). In general, the cultural 
agenda in the 2014-2018 declaration, unfortunately, was not represented by large 
joint projects. However, initiatives at the local level continued to develop, reflected 
in the Strategy for Cultural Cooperation (Ibid.). Following the BEAR documents, 
the youth support program also refers to the region's cultural issues since youth, in 
the opinion of the organization's participants, is the bearer of the region's unique 
culture. 
The goal of the Barents Cooperation has always been to overcome cultural 
barriers and create bridges between countries. This was confirmed in the next 
Barents Program 2019-2023. It focused on cultural cooperation between youth, 
schoolchildren, and the goal was to continue to popularize the BEAR brand 
(Creative Barents 2019-2023). It is emphasized that cultural cooperation will be 
carried out both through dialogue between the region's inhabitants and with the 
help of cultural institutions. It was decided that the Barents Cultural Cooperation 
Scholarship will be awarded every two years. 
Moreover, the emphasis is placed on youth and their cooperation in the 
current program. Supporting collaboration between schools, especially in the areas 
of culture, language, and the environment is seen as necessary as contributing to 
the development of new and strengthening of existing student exchange programs. 
Compared to previous cultural projects, programs were planned for 2019-2023 to 
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broadly support gender equality in the field of culture. The Barents Winter and 
Summer Games became an arena for sports and cultural exchange (Ibid.). 
I would like to highlight that in Russian Chairmanship Priorities for 2015-
2017, the necessity of developing cultural affairs was specifically mentioned 
(Priorities of the Russian chairmanship 2015-2017). Even more, Russian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov mentioned in his statement at the BEAC 
Ministerial Session in 2015 that “people-to-people contacts, and cultural exchanges 
will contribute to strengthening the concept of the Barents identity based on a 
common history and association with the same social and cultural space” 
(Statement by Sergey Lavrov 2015). At the same time, the overall context of the 
statement as well as of the Russian Chairmanship Priorities is devoted to the 
practical sides of the cooperation, such as energy, forestry, healthcare, reduction of 
environmental hot spots in the Russian part of the Barents Region, transport, and 
logistics issues as well as emergency prevention and response. 
To sum up, the development of the BEAR direction in foreign policy of Rusia 
is about national interests. It is also important to note that the development of the 
Arctic areas cannot be fulfilled without joint mutually beneficial work with 
international partners. “This cooperation ensures the development of Russia's 
northern regions, helps the rapprochement with the northern neighbors, and brings 
considerable economic benefits. Besides, it brings Russia closer to realizing its 
Arctic ambitions” (Kurylev and Petrova 2016). 
Cooperation carried out on two levels pursues several goals - a platform for 
resolving state problems and an opportunity for regions to communicate directly. 
For Russia, the BEAC and the BRC has become an opportunity to articulate 
problems and get closer to neighbors in the region, overcome cultural, economic, 
and political barriers, and hope for the development of a far from being the most 
popular and developed region of the country. To achieve the goals of mutual 
understanding, communication, and rapprochement of the population of the region, 
cultural diplomacy was used as a communication mechanism. All this is reflected in 
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the documents since the first programs devoted to culture as a tool for the 
development of the Region. 
 3.2 Analysis of 2003-2013 Barents Cultural programs  
In order to analyze the role of Russia in the cultural cooperation of the region, 
it is necessary to understand that any cultural cooperation directly depends on the 
political situation between the studied actors. In this case, the main starting point for 
the change in cultural ties is 2014 - the events in Crimea, sanctions, and a radical 
revision of Western colleagues' activities in Russia. Therefore, it is advisable to 
consider the programs of cultural cooperation the BEAR, dividing those that were 
adopted before 2014 and after it. 
Cultural cooperation the BEAR after 1993 was dynamic and productive. So, 
in the period from 1993 to 2000, 416 full-scale cultural projects were carried out. 
Indeed, Russia's role in the first decade was rather passive. Most of the cultural 
projects were funded mainly by Norway, Finland, and Sweden. The Ministry of 
Culture of the Arkhangelsk Region contributed part of the budget to projects, but 
this was only a small part. In the 90s, projects differed in a variety of directions, but 
dance programs and exhibitions prevailed. Russia took an active part in all projects, 
and the projects themselves were focused on the inclusion of Russian regions in the 
emerging Barents culture. However, in Russia, there were certain problems with 
participation in the BEAR projects. First of all, these are financial issues. While in 
the Nordic countries, cultural cooperation within the region is financed through the 
Foreign Ministries, the Russian Foreign Ministry does not provide such assistance 
to the territories. The issue of creating a single Russian BEAR fund has been raised 
several times, but it has not been resolved. In 1997, the Ministry of Culture of the 
Russian Federation for the first time accepted a consolidated application from three 
Russian participants in cooperation - the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions and 
the Republic of Karelia - for financing events, and some funds were allocated, but 
clearly insufficient to act as a full-fledged partner in this cooperation. 
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Cultural cooperation in the BEAR was aimed at involving as many actors as 
possible in this process. “This should contribute not only to mutual professional 
enrichment but also to the strengthening of mutual understanding and the 
development of cooperation” (Vostryakov 1998, 2).  
In the first decade of the region's activity, it was believed that cultural 
cooperation should not only promote culture and the unification of peoples but also 
should promote the economy. Undoubtedly, culture played the role of a conductor, 
ensuring success at the “stage of acquaintance”, but it did not solve more serious 
problems in the first decade. The volume of investments in the economy turned out 
to be insignificant. Otherwise, in a situation where cultural events retained a narrow 
departmental character and were not formalized in the form of large projects with 
the involvement of entrepreneurs and potential investors, at least in the form of 
sponsors and guests, it probably could not be. 
In general, the first decade was marked by the interpenetration of cultures. 
Russia participated in projects, although it did not finance them, relying on the 
subsequent development of the country's regions with Western colleagues' help 
according to documents and the project plans of the BEAR. (The Barents Euro-
Arctic Council’s documents) It should be said that help from neighbors during these 
years was also joyfully received in Russia. It turned out that cooperation at the initial 
stage was mostly idealistic and imbued with the belief that any cultural events 
contribute to the development of intercultural dialogue. The main points on which 
the cooperation was based was the opinion that culture served as an effective 
mechanism for transmitting information, creating trust, which was necessary for 
cooperation in other areas. 
According to the implementor of this Project in Russia, the first stage of the 
Program revealed many problems. Such as “randomness in carrying out events, lack 
of opportunity to provide and receive the necessary information in time, lack of 
coordination of actions and imbalance in different cultural areas” (Vostryakov 
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1998). He outlined problems of joint finances as one of the main problem 
(Vostryakov 1998). 
The first full-fledged program for cultural cooperation in the Barents region 
was signed in Arkhangelsk in 2002, was developed for 2003-2006, and was called 
“Voices of the Barents Region”. The Program pictured several objectives for the 
BEAR’s cultural cooperation: 
1. “To make the Barents Region culturally more visible at the international 
level and thus contribute to its economic development. 
2. To create new opportunities for the interaction of cultures, peoples, and 
especially youngsters. 
3. Consolidate creative and managerial forces to form the Barents Euro-Arctic 
region's identity as a unique cultural region in northern Europe” (Voices in the 
Barents Region 2003-2006).  
The main task of the Program was the development of multilateral 
cooperation. The priority was given to projects with the participation of three or 
more countries of the region.  
It should be noted here that the goals of cultural cooperation defined in the 
Program do not contradict the 2000 Russian Security Concept and, overall, repeat 
Russia's aspirations for active, positive representation in the world, even by separate 
regions. However, one should not forget that since 2001 the concept of «national 
interests» has already been reflected in the main Russian documents on culture. 
Therefore, clause 3 on the creation of a separate Barents identity could alert the 
Russian side.   
The regional working group determined several steps and strategies which 
determined the program. First of all, it was agreed that at least one representative 
from each of the four countries and representatives of all thirteen regions should 
participate. One of the most important issue was described as organized activities 
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and events “from people to people” (Voices in the Barents Region 2003-2006, 4). 
Organization of festivals and seminars decided to be the most effective way of 
transferring and exchanging cultural experience. That would help to share this 
experience. It was also noted that implementation of bilateral projects aimed at local 
problems of cultural cooperation were highly welcomed (Ibid., 5). 
The first program on the culture of the Barents region was divided into four 
sections. The “Multilateral Projects” section included 14 projects. Russia took part 
in all 14 projects from this section. Three of them were organized by Russian 
regions. Besides, during the period 2003-2006, another 13 projects were 
implemented that were not planned in the original program but successfully 
implemented. Among them, six were organized by the Russian regions (Voices in 
the Barents Region 2003-2006). 
In general, all multilateral cultural projects of the “Voices of the Barents 
Region” can be divided into the following areas, according to the official report (the 
only official report on the Barents program) (Report on the results of the Program of 
Cultural Cooperation in the Barents Region in 2003–2006 “Voices in The Barents 
Region”): 
Artistic projects. 
1. “Guest Studios for Artists” – the creation of a unified network of art 
workshops in the BEAR regions in order to provide free workplace and 
accommodation for artists who come to create their works. It is worth 
noting that although Russia did not act as the organizer, most of these guest 
studios were located on its territory (Ibid. 6). 
2. “New forms of art in the Barents region” (later - “Artistic innovations”) – 
this project “aimed to revitalize such areas of art as design and arts and 
crafts” (Ibid. 6). 
3. “Northern Cities” – was aimed at creating a positive image of the 
Region(Ibid. 6).  
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4. “Migration - visual art” – the project which involved the creation of a 
permanent mobile exhibition of works about traditions of the peoples in the 
Barents region. It was “aimed at strengthening mutual understanding and 
respect between people living on different sides of the borders”. (Ibid.6-7) 
Musical projects. 
1. “Chamber Orchestra of the Barents Region” – was the creation of a 
chamber orchestra of young musicians from the BEAR countries. The 
project was promising, but it lasted only a year due to lack of funding, but 
2 out of 3 rehearsals took place in Russia. 
2. “International Center for Choral Music in the Barents Region” – was a 
center of choral education. Its concerts were given in Russia and Finland, 
but this project was also closed due to lack of funding (Ibid. 8). 
3. “Barents Summer Music Academy” – was a Russian project that created 
“an open institute in the field of music education, in which well-known 
Russian and foreign musicians could be involved in teaching” (Ibid. 8). 
Literary projects. 
1. “Young Writers of the Barents Region” – was a big project which desired 
to at expand knowledge about the Barents Region among children and 
young citizens of the region. Within the scope of the «Young Writers of the 
Barents Region» project, an international competition for children's 
handwritten books has been held for all four years, which is still the most 
significant international children's project in the BEAR. The organizer was 
the Murmansk Regional Children's and Youth Library. The number of 
project participants has reached 2000 people. The “Young Writers of the 
Barents Region” project was closely related to the other “Barents Literary 
Camp for Youth” project. As a result of joint activities on these projects in 
2005, the final festival of children's and youth literature “Centropheria” was 
held, at which a collection of literary works by young writers named 
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“Centropheria. Anthology of Young Writers of the Barents Region”, was 
published in Petrozavodsk (Ibid. 9). 
2. “Barents literary camp for youth” – Russia became the site of the camp 
twice during the period of implementation of the program. However, 
funding data available only for 2005 suggests that Russia contributed the 
least amount to the project's development compared to the rest of the 
participants. Unfortunately, the websites of all the projects above are no 
longer available, so it is not possible to access the rest of the financial 
statements (Ibid. 9). 
3. “Children's Polar Library” is a virtual library for children and adolescents, 
which was to be posted on the Internet portal in order to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the libraries of the future. During the Children's Polar 
Library project, websites were opened in Sweden, Norway, and Finland, 
but the Russian side refrained from participating in the project in this 
format, although the libraries provided information for foreign colleagues. 
Perhaps in 2003-2006, there was no possibility of using the Internet in the 
Barents regions of Russia for such projects (Ibid. 9). 
Projects for the Barents region cultural heritage development 
1. “Cultural Portal of the Barents Region” – was an interactive platform for 
specialists’ communication (Ibid. 9). 
2. “Rock painting on the outskirts of Europe” – “a project aimed at identifying 
and preserving archaeological heritage objects in the BEAR countries, 
especially rock carvings” (Ibid., 10). Karelia took an active part in the 
project, received funding for the study of petroglyphs, but the project did 
not achieve all its goals and objectives since a similar project already 
existed in parallel, which involved some regions of the BEAR and made it 
difficult to obtain funding (Ibid. 9). 
3. “Gateway to Barents” - had the aim to create consulting centers in the 
BEAR where all the information about the region and its projects would be 
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stored.  The project was financed from the participating regions' own 
sources, grants from the Northern Cultural Fund, and sponsorship from the 
Russian Cotton holding. As a result of the project, a network of experienced 
and trained experts was created in 6 regions of Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
Russia, and Estonia, who support cultural cooperation in their regions on 
international project activities and search for partners (Ibid. 9). 
4. “The Second World War - 1000 Letters About War and Peace” – a project 
dedicated to an exhibition about the letters written during the Second World 
War (Ibid. 9-10). 
It is worth paying attention to which projects were under the patronage of the 
Russian side. Among the planned programs is the Barents Summer Music Academy, 
the organizer of the project is the Ministry of Culture and Public Relations of the 
Republic of Karelia, the subproject “Young Writers of the Barents Region” and 
“World War II - 1000 Letters about War and Peace” a project from the National 
Museum and the Ministry of Culture Komi Republic. The Barents Summer Music 
Academy was not a unique project for the region. In the same period, a literary-
oriented summer camp was active. Consequently, the musical project's organization 
did not stand out from the general outline of other participants' events. That was not 
true for the project dedicated to the Second World War.  
However, the Barents Summer Music Academy was directed, contrary to the 
original idea, exclusively at Russian participants and lost its multilateral character. 
Thus, the project did not fulfill the declared international character but was carried 
out under the auspices of the Barents region. On the contrary, the international 
competition for children's handwritten books proved to be quite popular and met all 
multilateral project requirements in the Barents region. 
«The Second World War - 1000 Letters about War and Peace» turned out to 
be a project that did not receive a response from its neighbors, partly because the 
information is presented only for the Komi Republic and the Republic of Karelia 
and only in Russian. Perhaps the incredible popularity of the theme of the Second 
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World War is spread mainly on Russia's territory. This project was aimed at residents 
of the Russian part of the region. Other project participants did not send materials 
for participation. 
Projects outside the Voices of the Barents Region program, organized by the 
Russian side, included literary events, tourism development, theatrical arts, and 
bilateral projects between Russia and Norway.” 
During the implementation of the Cultural Cooperation Program 2003-2006 
“Voices of the Barents Region”, hundreds of exchange visits were made by 
participants in cultural cooperation.  
A fact that regional centers and small settlements were actively involved in 
this process became an essential point. For example, Severomorsk of the Murmansk 
region, despite the complexity of its visit by foreign citizens, has been successfully 
developing sister-city relations with the Finnish city of Kem and the Norwegian 
commune of Sor-Varanger for many years now.  
Another important aspect was the practice of concluding bilateral agreements 
on cooperation in the field of culture and art with a validity period of 1–2 years 
between the cultural authorities of the BEAR territories, which was finally formed 
during the implementation of the “Voices of the Barents Region” Program. Those 
agreements between Russian and Finland cities  were implemented shortly after the 
program was released.   
The report of the “Voices of the Barents Region” program points out the pros 
and cons of implementing the activities (Voices of the Barents Region 2003-2006). 
For example, the authors argue that “A single cultural space has been created on the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Region territory” (Ibid., 26), however, it is difficult to embrace 
it unequivocally. Russia took part in almost all events and provided venues for their 
holding. However, the fact that two out of three above-mentioned projects from the 
draft programs aimed at multilateral cooperation, in fact, met the interests of Russia 
exclusively and did not attract neighbors in the region, shows that the cultural agenda 
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declared to the outside is somewhat different from other regions. At the same time, 
2003-2006 became the period of Russia's most extraordinary openness in holding 
cultural events in the Region. The reports show that the BEAR's function as a liaison 
between Europe and Russia has been fulfilled. The report shows how significant the 
presence of Russian regions is, is comprehensive, and desirable according to the 
amount of the projects involving Russia. However, all the same events under 
Russia's patronage stand out from the general canvas of transboundary and building 
a common identity. 
One more conclusion of the Report “Achieved real equal partnership” remains 
quite controversial. “The implementation of the Program contributed to the 
involvement of all the BEAR regions in cooperation equally. Before the adoption of 
the Program, cooperation developed more in the border areas. Due to the lack of the 
necessary experience in international project activities from the Russian participants, 
the projects' main responsibility fell on the organizations of Norway, Finland, and 
Sweden” (Voices in The Barents Region 2003-2006, 19). It was noted that during 
this program, all regions acted as equal and more important financed the projects 
equally (Ibid.).  
It is difficult to agree entirely with this conclusion since the report shows that 
the Russian regions took a financial part in the projects, but their contribution was 
one of the most insignificant. Nevertheless, except for festivals held in Russia, 
almost all events were directed in one way or another to Russia's citizens living in 
the Region. 
In general, the Program for Cultural Cooperation in the Barents Region for 
2003-2006 “Voices of the Barents Region” was the first large-scale experience of 
organizing planned cultural cooperation in BEAR. The role of Russia turned out to 
be multifaceted. For the most part, it can be called an active participant in events, a 
recipient of grants, and a very hospitable neighbor. However, our own multilateral 
projects were not aimed at developing the region's common identity but at 
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introducing the national agenda of Russia and developing the regions included in the 
BEAR. As it was shown by the projects which Russia presented.  
The second cultural program of the Barents region, “New winds in the Barents 
region”, is a continuation of the first program aimed to promote cultural diversity 
and multicultural dialogue and use culture as one of the tools for regional, social and 
economic development (New winds in the Barents Region 2008-2010). “The 
overarching goal of the Cultural Cooperation Program 2008-2010 is to strengthen 
cultural cooperation further and increase the importance of culture itself in the 
Barents Region. The goal of the Program is to promote the formation of cultural 
diversity and the creation of intercultural dialogue, to consider culture as a means of 
social and economic development of the region, and to identify new places for 
cultural meetings” (Ibid. 15). Thus, there was no fundamental change in the goals 
and objectives of the program.   However, this period became one of the most 
important in cultural cooperation in the BEAR for Russia. This was reflected in the 
number of projects organized by Russia in 2008-2010 and its chairmanship of the 
BEAC 2007-2009. “The Russian Chairmanship's priority will be to ensure 
sustainable development in the Barents Region with emphasis on social and 
economic factors, linking it closely to the compliance with environmental 
requirements, and also to support for the indigenous peoples” (Program of the 
Russian Charmanship in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2007 - 2009). Although 
the main cultural agenda of Russia for the period of chairmanship was not stated in 
the 2007 program, the second Cultural Program revealed the main provisions and 
projects. 
The 2008-2010 project plan showed that culture's main directions, such as 
music and art, have remained mainstream. However, it can be traced that the Russian 
projects in the second program become tied to the locality and culture of specific 
peoples living on it. For example, “The white sea - Center for Culture and Tourism 
in Belomorsk,” “Karelia Renaissance - the southern Karelia historical villages - 
rebirth project.”, “International festival of epics Kalevala,” “Cooperation projects 
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between the Karelian State Philharmonic and Barents euro -arctic region.” At the 
same time, one may note that projects not from Russia were aimed at the 
international participation and did not have any dominant culture in them. They were 
designed for the creation of the common Barents identity in contrast with Russian 
projects (New winds in the Barents Region 2008-2010). 
However, five projects were aimed at international equivalent cooperation. 
During the second program, Russia carried out an international choreography 
project, Dances in the Polar Circle, which began in 2009 and lasted until 2018, 
judging by open sources. However, by 2016, the initial project had completed its 
work, and the idea of a festival with an almost identical project went beyond the 
Barents region. Although by 2013, only Norway took part in the festival due to its 
close ties with Murmansk (IV International Festival-Competition of Choreographic 
Art 2013).  
It should be noted that Russia's cultural events, contrary to the rest of the 
BEAR, were not aimed at cultural exchange among children and youth, and the main 
exchange of competences was through training programs for officials, teachers, and 
cultural workers (New winds in the Barents Region 2008-2010).  
Such an example is the international project «Development of the 
competencies of cultural managers: development of an innovative model for the 
North-West of Russia» (“Cultural Competence Cluster”) (2008 - 2009) (Lapteva G 
2009, 26-27). The Nordic countries' internship participants (Sweden and Denmark) 
were representatives of the administration, cultural managers, heads of state, and 
municipal cultural institutions of the Arkhangelsk and Murmansk regions. The other 
projects had the same representation: “Bridges of understanding and friendship: 
television conference about children's and youth's spiritual development,” 
“International scientific conference: Cultural heritage of Barents region,” 
“Cooperation projects between the Karelian State Philharmonic and Barents euro- 
arctic region.”  
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During this period, a relatively large number of bilateral projects which were 
not included in the Cultural Program were carried out at the regional level. However, 
Russia remains a platform for various, mainly ethnographic festivals and events. 
Unfortunately, the annual reports of the JWGC do not provide complete data on the 
implementation of cultural programs in 2008–2010. Taking them into account, one 
can trace that the period of Russian chairmanship 2007–2009 became the most active 
for Russian projects, forums on its territory, and international festivals. 
Thus, the second Cultural Cooperation Program, “New winds in the Barents 
Region”, became a program project during the Russian chairmanship of BEAC 
(Program of the Russian Charmanship in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2007 - 
2009). Russia organized many more events than in one program, which significantly 
increased all participants' equivalence in cooperation. However, again, most of the 
projects were devoted to issues that reflected Russian interests or concerned them. 
Despite the Program's statements about the creation and strengthening of a single 
cultural identity, Russia's programs are far from its creation. In 2008-2010, Russia 
was more likely to use the BEAR as a representative platform for its own capabilities 
and focuses its efforts on drawing attention to its northern regions. 
Of course, at the municipalities' level, the picture was slightly different. 
However, the cities were mostly involved in bilateral activities rather than in 
multilateral ones. These were the relations that had developed over the years thanks 
to the proximity of borders. It should be noted that 2008-2010 became a period of 
active exchange of information in the field of culture. The Russian regions became 
an open platform for this exchange and territory of opportunities. This was also due 
to Russia's largely favorable agenda in the international arena. The number of 
projects with the participation and under the leadership of Russia increased, but at 
the same time, the agenda of Russian projects in the second Program was not 
internationally oriented. 
“New Horizons in the Barents Region” 2011–2013 was the third cultural 
cooperation program in the Barents Region. It was adopted in Arkhangelsk and 
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retained the direction of the first two. However, in the third program, great emphasis 
was placed on youth activities to promote cultural diversity and intercultural 
dialogue, create new meeting places for different cultures, and increase the 
importance of culture for development. 
It is interesting to note that on the JWGC official website, this program is 
presented only in English, whereas before that, all official documents have been 
presented even in Russian (New Horizons in the Barents Region 2011-2013). 
Unfortunately, there is no single document with the list of the Program's projects on 
the official website. Information can only be found through the regional reports of 
the Russian regions' cultural departments; however, it is impossible to separate the 
state’s initiatives, and program's one. Therefore, one will focus on multilateral 
projects under the regions' leadership exclusively. 
The Ministry of Culture of the Arkhangelsk Region was actively involved in 
positioning the Arkhangelsk Region as one of the international cultural centers of 
the BEAR through work within the framework of the JWGC. For the specified 
period, the Arkhangelsk region became the organizer of the International Scientific 
and Cultural Barents Forum. Opening of the exhibition “Secrets of the Arctic Seas. 
Marine Diary of the Willem Barents Expedition ”, Project“ Cold Shores - Close 
Relations: History of Polar Expeditions and Northern Navigation ”: opening of 
exhibitions in Onega and Tromso (Norway), VI International Music and Theater 
Festival“ European Spring,” XVII International street theater festival, «Living 
Stories» - an international exhibition project.  
The Murmansk Region organized the International Festival of Puppet 
Theaters of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, «Friendship Bridge 20 Years Long», 
«Art Biennale» X-Border, «which was a subproject in the field of contemporary art 
of the large-scale project» New Horizons of the Barents Region 2013– 2014». The 
Republic of Karelia represented the International Environmental Film Festival in 
Karelia, and the Komi Republic did not act as an organizer in program projects but 
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was an active participant (Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Archival Affairs of the 
Komi Republic 2012, 23). 
Art, music, and literature remained the main focus of events. It is important to 
note that the number of multilateral projects and activities has slightly decreased 
compared to the number of projects in the previous program, but the number and 
quality of bilateral projects have increased. However, they took place only among 
close neighbors in the Region. The number of scientific projects increased, although 
those organized by the Russian side were again aimed at leaders rather than young 
people and students. 
According to the available data, it can be concluded that during the period 
2011-2013, the number of multilateral projects decreased (possibly due to the fact 
that Russia ceased to lead the BEAC, and there was no need to present the country 
actively). The projects' cultural orientation remained practically unchanged, despite 
a slight shift in emphasis towards the development of youth exchanges. Russia 
mainly organized training courses for leaders.  
It should be noted that the Russian regions remain venues for numerous 
festivals and bilateral projects, actively participating in many large-scale projects, 
for example, New Horizons in the Barents Region 2013–2014. New Horizons in the 
Barents Region 2013–2014 is a continuation of the same name's cultural program - 
the largest and most successful program ever to appear in the BEAR on its own. 
European grants from the Kolarctic provided its funding, but all countries took part 
in creating the events (New Horizons 2013-2014). 
Perhaps this was the event that reflects the essence of such a partnership. 
Russia, together with Finland, was responsible for music and literature projects. All 
countries and almost all municipalities in the Region were involved in organizing 
and conducting the events. It indeed was a culture-based unifying collaboration. 
The decade during which the first three cultural cooperation programs in the 
Barents Region have been operating has been eventful. The first programs' goals and 
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objectives were almost identical and aimed at establishing close structured contacts, 
developing a common culture in the Region. Russia took part in the Barents region's 
programs at two levels: state and regional.  
Over the first decade of the Programs, one can trace the development of 
Russia's role from a recipient of projects and an active participant to a full-fledged 
organizer of various multilateral events. This period is notable for the openness of 
sites for the reception of neighbors and their initiatives and the desire to draw 
attention to the northern regions of the country. Russia pinned hopes that economic 
projects would also be implemented through cultural cooperation. 
Unfortunately, not all the initiatives of the Russian regions have been 
successful. Many projects died without a response from neighbors and without 
funding, for example “Dances in the Polar circle” that stopped existing in 2016. 
However, some Program Projects in Russia do not fully meet the spirit of creating a 
single identity for the region, which the participants in cooperation call for. Russian 
projects instead do not unite common values but present their agenda through 
culture. This is just an example of how soft politics, which is represented through 
such projects, works in Russia to preserve national interests, which have been 
actively featured in the National Security Strategy since 2000. 
In accordance with the Concepts of Russia's foreign cultural policy for this 
period, the position of the Russian regions is quite open. However, through some 
events, it is possible to trace the national agenda of the state. The state's position 
regarding such cooperation is absolutely non-aggressive. Even state and local media 
perceive this cultural exchange favorably. Over the decade, Russia has been 
transforming from an observer to an organizer, although funding for projects is not 
entirely equal. 
Thus, the 90s made it possible for Russia to become a member of the 
partnership, and the first decade of the Programs strengthened good-neighborly 
relations through cultural projects. Due to a slightly changed perception of the 
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concept of “soft power”, projects were carried out through Programs aimed at 
representing national interests rather than creating a single identity. Perhaps, the 
question of a single identity in the 2003–2013 Programs was the only one that did 
not completely suit Russia. During this period, it was ignored by official 
representatives. 
The 2003–2013 programs expanded bilateral cooperation between the 
regions. Municipal projects have a different focus during this period. Although, 
unfortunately, multilateralism was not fully implemented, as the BEAR and the 
BEAC conceived it, the rapid development of bilateral projects was also due to the 
Programs. 
It can be said that at this stage, the role of Russia was transitional. The Russian 
regions were very active and strove for further communication with each other. The 
first large-scale projects appeared, aimed at the common Barents Region for the 
peoples represented. In the future, the state line of national and cultural policy could 
retreat, making it possible for the BEAR regions to develop together, as has been 
planned since 1993. However, there was a second way, which included tight control 
of the Arctic zone situation and the promotion of their interests, including through 
culture. In 2003-2013, Russia was balancing between these options, trying to bring 
its own interests to the common Barents agenda while remaining interested in 
cooperation. 
3.3 Analysis of 2014-2023 Barents Cultural programs  
The stages of Russia's cooperation in the region very much depend on the 
political situation in the international arena, although even some Russian members 
of the organization deny this. In the 90s, there was a constant flow of directed 
investments to develop the Russian parts of the region and active growth and 
development. Since the mid-2000s, with the beginning of the strengthening of the 
spread of Russia's national interests through culture, Russia has somewhat changed 
its approach and has become not only a recipient but also an organizer of projects. 
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The year 2014 was a turning point for many aspects of Russian politics. 
However, the adoption of the fourth cultural program in the Barents region took 
place back in 2013 long before the events, but it is important to trace whether 
international relations influenced the role of Russia in cultural cooperation in the 
Barents region. In 2013, the Russian authorities indicated that science was one of 
the most important components of cooperation: “we see it as a 'smart' part of Europe, 
consistently developing innovative and high-tech interaction to benefit the people 
living here, including the indigenous population” (Ministry of Culture of the 
Arkhangelsk Region 2013). 
In general, the vector of cooperation interests was shifted in the new cultural 
program. The mission formulated new ideas for cooperation in the field of science 
and youth policy. Moreover, an important goal was to attract business to the region 
through culture (Cultural Cooperation in the Barents Region Strategy 2014–2018). 
Over the years of BEAR's official existence, cooperation has been developing in 
many areas, while culture is considered a full partner of the economy. Undoubtedly, 
culture played the role of a conductor, ensuring success at the «acquaintance stage», 
but it has not yet achieved the solution of more serious problems. The volume of 
investments in the economy turned out to be insignificant. However, economic goals 
were also significant for the development of the region. 
The Russian side noted that the regional council plays the leading connecting 
role in the organisation’s coordination and work. This remark is especially important 
in connection with the transfer of powers to Arkhangelsk as chairman of the 
Regional Council. 
It is worth noting that the main areas of work of the 2014–2018 Program, at 
least for the initial period, remained the New Horizons 2013–2014 program, as well 
as the Kolarctic. It is noteworthy that Kolarctic became the only one of the four big 
international projects financed by the EU in which Russia participated. 
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The Arkhangelsk Region was the flagship in cooperation at the initial stage of 
the Program implementation. For example, in Archangelsk such exchange programs 
were organized for young artists, dancers, and musicians from Norway and students 
of the Arkhangelsk College of Culture and Art. They worked together on the 
Russian-Norwegian projects such as “Arctic Articulation” and “Youth Arctic 
Dialogue” (Ministry of Culture of the Arkhangelsk Region 2014). 
In the Russian documents during the first stage of the Program 2014-2018, it 
was noted that the success of regional cooperation in the field of culture directly 
depended on the simplification of the visa regime. However, unfortunately, such 
ideas ceased to appear in documents and statements after 2015, when events in the 
international arena, sanctions, and complication of relations between the EU and 
Russia. 
Thus, during the first period of the Program's implementation, there were no 
fundamental changes in participants' roles and a shift in Russia's cultural policy 
focus. Arkhangelsk played the main role in the connection of the regions as the head 
of the regional council, the implementation of the global program «New Horizons» 
continued, where the regions of Russia played one of the leading roles, although it 
is worth noting that Norway and Sweden had the training part of the project. Bilateral 
cooperation continued in the Russian regions in the same volume and the same 
directions. A scholarship was even offered in the field of culture, which was 
supported by Russia and implemented in 2016 (Barents Scholarship for Cultural 
Cooperation Guidelines 2016).  
In 2015, the number of negative statements in the Russian press about the 
Barents region increased. The BEAR has evolved into a Norwegian conspiracy to 
destroy the Russian north from a promising cooperation among media outlets 
(Semushin 2015). Henceforth, everything that concerned culture was perceived as 
an encroachment on the region's integrity and as a desire to spread influence on 
young people, especially students, of the Russian north. According to the materials, 
the newspapers that suddenly changed their minds about cooperation in the Barents 
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region belong to those considered to be direct transmitters of the Kremlin's official 
position. So, considering the above, since about 2013–2015, there has been a 
systemic deterioration in the perception of the Barents region within Russia at the 
state policy level. 
Indeed, the shift in the significance of these regional relations was evident. 
The 2012 Russian security concept, as well as the 2012 Arctic development strategy, 
attached particular importance to the preservation of peaceful relations in the Arctic 
regions. However, they pay little attention to joint actions with other countries to 
preserve peace, whereas earlier such documents spoke of cooperation to support a 
peaceful neighborhood in the region. This, as follows from the documents, should 
have been facilitated by culture. 
Since that time, soft power has ceased to work for Russia's foreign policy to 
attract foreign citizens. It was more focused on protecting national interests and not 
involving its citizens in forming Barents identity and participation in “untrusty” 
projects than ever before. Some researchers note that from a certain period, the 
cultural policy of Russia began to transform from liberal to conservative. 
At the BEAC level, the number of initiatives from Russia decreased, and those 
that remained were not as large as during its first leadership of the Council. The 
2014-2018 program set one of the main tasks to increase education's attractiveness 
in the region. Firstly, this concerns the already mentioned scholarship program in 
the field of culture. However, judging by the report for 2015-2017, Russia was the 
least involved in the scholarship approval process. There were problems with 
financing and accepting the necessary documents (The Report during the 
Chairmanship period 2015-2017). 
The Culture Report 2015-2017 was generally quite disappointing. It dealt with 
one large program of the Region. Whereas in the reports of other years, there were 
much more projects in which Russia participated. Moreover, almost every meeting 
of the Council for Culture during this period, as indicated, did not achieve its goals 
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due to Russia's bureaucratic problems. This fact was strange since 2015-2017 was 
the period of Russian chairmanship at the BEAC. 
However, during this period, Russia continued and expanded cooperation 
between universities, which was reflected in its program (Ivanov 2014). Special 
attention was also paid to the indigenous peoples (Priorities of the Russian 
chairmanship 2015-2017). Unfortunately, since 2015 one can observe a decrease in 
an international character's cultural events in the regions. 
For example, judging by the «Passport of the cultural life of the Arkhangelsk 
region» for 2015-2018, international projects' number and scale decreased 
dramatically from over a hundred to nearly 20. As well as the directions through 
which cultural diplomacy was conducted. During this period, the Arkhangelsk 
region became less representative of the region in the Barents countries. Even 
international festivals were only in musical and theater area. One can note a smaller 
scale of events and coverage of events in the press, especially foreign ones. 
Significant cultural events such as the “Urban Camp International Festival” and 
“The Northern Voices Project” were bilateral, not multilateral. Moreover, even the 
number of bilateral projects became less from several dozens to less than 10 
(Analytics and reports of the Arkhangelsk region).  
Thus, it can be concluded that during the period of the fourth program on 
cultural cooperation in the Barents region, state interests began to shift towards the 
protection of the national interests of Russia. Cultural diplomacy ceased to be 
dominant in cooperation. The number of multilateral projects confirmed at the state 
level has decreased, while bilateral ties between regions have continued to 
strengthen. However, the trend of close cooperation between neighboring regions of 
different countries has only become firmly established, contrary to the programmatic 
goals of expanding cooperation between different regions. 
One can say that since 2015 Russia has been pursuing a more closed policy in 
the Region. There were no new programs organized by Russia, and in some, it seems 
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to have lost interest. The cultural involvement is less than ever before. Indirectly, 
the deteriorating perception of the region's activities and Russia's changing goals in 
it are indicated by incriminating articles from newspapers that have not previously 
expressed concerns about the cultural activities of other countries in the BEAR 
territory. However, bilateral ties between cities, universities, and teams remained the 
same, although some visits were canceled due to funding cuts. 
Thus, in the period from 2014 to 2018 at the state level, Russia lost interest in 
close cooperation in the field of culture among the BEAR countries. The regions 
were more interested in continuing cooperation. However, their ties were mainly 
bilateral and cross-border, and a change in the state policy vector significantly 
affected the openness of borders, the number of festivals, and involvement in large-
scale projects. 
The current program is designed for four years (Creative Barents 2019-2023). 
“Creative Barents 2019-2023” is the fifth cultural program and the first in which the 
creation and promotion of Barents identity are among the main tasks. Also, the 
program sets the goal of cooperation between the inhabitants of the region and the 
desire to transform cultural cooperation into an economic one (Ibid.). 
The entire program is aimed at creating and maintaining the Barents identity. 
Russia supported the Program, but national interests, Arctic policy, and the National 
Security Concept do not reflect this initiative. On the contrary, all official documents 
did not reflect an interest in creating a certain identity. Moreover, all projects led by 
Russia have never reflected this side of the partnership. Since about 2015, Russia 
has stopped offering new multilateral programs. Furthermore, the 2019 report did 
not mention any achievements of the Russian regions (Annual Report 2019).  
In the Russian Foreign Ministry's comments in connection with Lavrov's visit 
to Norway in 2019, it was noted that “Traditionally, relations between Russia and 
Norway have been characterized by constructiveness and mutual understanding. 
However, after 2014, due to Oslo's accession to the anti-Russian sanctions measures 
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of Brussels and Washington, as well as the collapse of several areas of cooperation 
on their own initiative, their previous forward dynamics were significantly slowed 
down. Currently, they are developing unstably” (Comment by the Information and 
Press Department on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Norway). This 
statement was also true for relations at the level of states in the Region. 
However, the dialogue at the Regional Council level did not stop, although it 
was significantly complicated by sanctions and mutual mistrust on both sides. For 
example, previously, numerous Barents international projects in the Arkhangelsk 
region were reduced to two in 2019 (Passport of the cultural life of the Arkhangelsk 
region 2019). Russia's regions have ceased to be an open platform for international 
cultural cooperation, at least as it was at the pre-crisis level. 
Summing up all five programs and the role of Russia in cultural cooperation 
in the Barents Region, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
The first stage of cooperation in the field of culture fell in the pre-program 
period 1993-2003. During this time, bridges of friendship were built, and the first 
multilateral events were held. During this period, the role of Russia was passive in 
terms of organizing projects and holding events. However, the first decade was 
marked by many projects aimed at interaction with Russia and carried out at sites in 
Russia. For the first decade, Russian cultural diplomacy played a role not so much 
outside the country as, following the Kremlin's official documents, strived for 
openness on its own territory. 
The second stage of the relationship fell on the first three Programs for the 
cultural development of the Region. This period can be called the most active period 
of cultural diplomacy on both sides. Russia ceased to be a recipient of all projects 
and grants but entered an equal partnership and became a part of main projects in 
the Barents region. However, the duality of cooperation between the Region is 
manifested in the actions of the Russian side. While regional cooperation, especially 
cross-border cooperation, developed and enjoyed success, government policy at the 
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Council level had different goals. However, this period was the most successful in 
terms of implementing multilateral projects with Russia's participation. Researchers 
also note this fact, but at the same time, Oldberg claims that restrictions exist and 
mostly they are due to the lack of funding (Oldberg 2014, 29-30). He also notes that 
there is another Russian fear of cultural exchange “…fear of Western politicization. 
Still, cultural, educational and scientific cooperation can in several ways be seen as 
a substitute for overt cooperation on democratic and human rights issues” (Oldberg 
2014, 29-30).  
The third stage began a little later than the adoption of the fourth cultural 
program, as it was associated with events in the international arena that influenced 
Russia's entire foreign cultural policy (Vlaeminck 2017, 62). It has become more 
“protective,” and the number of international events has decreased significantly. 
Rhetoric has shifted from «open dialogue» to «preserving the integrity and values of 
Russia» (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016). Despite the 
statements about readiness for cooperation, the state level of cultural policy is losing 
interest in the region. Moreover, Barents is not ready to create an identity. However, 
cross-border cooperation at the Regional Council level is quite popular and is 




3. PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL 
COOPERATION IN THE REGION IN THE POST-COVID ERA 
The 2020 epidemic has made adjustments to all cultural programs that have 
taken place in the world. The pandemic of the new coronavirus and the strict anti-
epidemic measures introduced by various countries have accelerated the 
transformation of world tourism and the cultural sector. According to a study by 
UNESCO and the International Council of Museums, more than 10% of museums 
may never reopen after the end of the pandemic. Cultural institutions worldwide 
suffered millions in financial losses, and hundreds of thousands of artists were left 
without jobs and opportunities for creative and professional development (UNESCO 
2020, 6).  
Recent research claims that “…when thinking about recovery for the cultural 
and creative sectors after the COVID-19 crisis, a return to the ‘old normal’ is not 
considered a desirable option” (Cultural and creative sectors in postCOVID-19 
Europe 2021, 16). An analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on various 
cultural and creative projects underlines that some of the practices the sector is built 
on were neither healthy nor strong. Cultural cooperation needs a structural 
transformation towards more sustainable, equitable working methods. Many 
researchers do not believe that international cultural cooperation will return fully 
offline. “This is not the end of the world, but the end of a world” (Ibid. 5). Therefore, 
there is a need to revise all work on cultural projects globally. 
The Barents region has suffered just like everyone else. The cultural 
cooperation program was either suspended or moved to the online space. Theatrical 
performances and literary meetings were held online, while the development of 
sports and the holding of the Barents Game 2020 were canceled (Barents Winter 
Games 2020). Also, all exchange projects and festivals were canceled, which most 
of all united the residents of the region and allowed their open communication. The 
Head of the Russian Ministry of Culture, Olga Lyubimova, believed that «Cultural 
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institutions have suffered and continue to incur colossal losses ... and it will take 
years to restore the industry» (Interfax 2020).  
American diplomacy claims that “Diplomats joined the front lines of the 
crisis, with embassies struggling to maintain their diplomatic footprint, strengthen 
important bilateral cooperation, and provide consular services in a complex 
environment to stranded nationals” (Labott 2021, 5). They suppose that while 
“virtual public diplomacy can also be less organic and insightful” it is a future for a 
new age of diplomacy after the COVID-19 (Ibid. 6). “COVID-19 may change 
diplomacy dramatically — by helping it re-focus on what is really important” 
(Volker 2021). Traditional diplomacy faced a new reality that never happened 
before. Traditional ways of communicating and whole cultural diplomacy became 
useless in one day.  
Many cross-border cultural alliances were at risk of losing what has already 
been achieved. Almost all of them had aimed to connect people through personal 
experience. Public Diplomacy is traditionally understood as a sovereign nation’s 
effort to inform and influence foreign publics through open communications. The 
issue is very recent, and there is no opportunity to refer to experts' experience 
because the first book on comprehending new cultural diplomacy in the post-COVID 
era is not issued yet (Alhashimi and Fiallo 2021).  
There are two ways of overcoming the COVID-19 crisis. The first one is 
“Recovery” or “Back to normal.” It is based on the assumption that the cultural 
sector was healthy and strong before the COVID-19 crisis and that the severe impact 
on the sector is due to strict containment measures. It considers the “Back to 
Normal” as a reference point to design support schemes and legislative actions. It 
also applies a short-term approach that aims at getting the sector out of the crisis by 
building on the emergency measures taken during the crisis management phase 
(Cultural and creative sectors in postCOVID-19 Europe 2021, 53). 
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The second approach is the “Sustainability transition approach” or “Repair 
and prepare” (European Commission - Press release May 27,2020). It assumes that 
the pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing unsustainability and that the strict 
containment measures were the last in a series of cumulative unsustainable 
situations. It considers the ‘New Normal’ as a part of a long-term transformation. 
This change is a starting point to guide and shape short-term action. The long-term 
approach is to make the sector crisis-resistant by substantively and sustainably 
addressing the root causes of unsustainability (Cultural and creative sectors in 
postCOVID-19 Europe 2021).  
Some specialists in Russia claim that “The coronavirus pandemic has 
revolutionized digitalization instead of its evolutionary penetration and has changed 
all international cooperation sectors” (Bondareva 2021, 36). The opinion is correct, 
but there is no surprise in this revolution. It became the last resort in this crisis. For 
example, all international communication, including the Barents region’s was online 
during the pandemic (The Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation). This was the only 
chance to keep the connection and continue the work.  
As has already been mentioned, almost all the projects from the Cultural 
Program 2019-2023 were stopped or canceled in 2020. Regional cultural 
communication severed more than state one. First of all, that happened because a 
significant number of projects at this level were cross-border and demanded the 
presence of its participants. More than that, in Russia's case, most of the 
communication in the current situation is on a regional level. Consequently, there 
were many small projects offline that could never be transferred online, and the lack 
of big projects on the governmental level damaged the regional cooperation greatly.  
According to the state’s authority, it seems that Russia chose the “Recovery” 
or “Back to normal” approach in Barents cultural communication. Even if this 
previous “normality” was shaky, this conclusion was formulated due to the hopes of 
literal “back to normal cooperation,” the return of the usual cultural activities to the 
region, and the absence of any official reports on the need for new cultural 
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cooperation in the Barents region. If there are no future lockdowns or major 
instability in the sector, this strategy may continue working.  
There are also two main scenarios of the future Russian role in the Barents 
region after the pandemic, even applying the “Back to normal” approach. The first 
one can be called realistic. As has already been mentioned, Russian cultural policy 
is highly vulnerable due to the political situation.  The year 2014 was a beginning of 
such a situation. After Donbas and the Crimea crisis, many European countries 
declared sanctions against Russia. The Barents states were included in that list. The 
cultural sector or cultural diplomacy was not at stake, but the European sanctions 
influenced economic and military sectors that led to mistrust in other cooperation 
sectors (Comment by the Information and Press Department on Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Norway October 24, 2019). In response to that, Russia 
started cultural, economic, and political separations from the rest of the West. The 
annual results of Barents Cultural programs since 2016 show that separation. The 
intergovernmental level, at least in the cultural sector, was almost inactive; however, 
at the regional level, the connection remained strong but fewer projects with the 
lesser scope were put into practice. Now some problems cannot be resolved 
culturally. For example, in 2014, there was a joint musical festival on Spitsbergen 
(“Grumant” - the first music festival in Svalbard August 13,2014). Barents states 
supposed it a new forum for communication and a successful way of resolving 
problems through cultural diplomacy. Unfortunately, in 2020 the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation claimed that Norway refused Russia its 
right to use the island, and Norway accused Russia of violation of the agreement 
1920 (Ignatiev 2020). There are no more cultural festivals that can solve such a 
delicate problem.  
The realistic scenario suggests that Russia is perceived as a threat in the 
Barents region. Hence the number of projects and open communication will decline. 
On the one hand, the reason is mistrust and the lack of joint forces in 
intergovernmental projects. On the other hand, it is the Russian choice. Answering 
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the European threat, as it is perceived in Russia, the state must protect its borders 
and citizens. Cultural influence from “hostile” states is highly unwelcome. This can 
be seen in the latest official security documents and a new cultural policy. The 
current Barents Cultural Program is mainly about forming a Barents identity, but 
according to Russian officials and programs, it has no desire to form one. Besides 
the official ones, the identity is a threat to the state's cultural heritage and politics. 
So, Russia's current position in the Barents region is cautious, and it will continue to 
be such.  
According to this scenario, there will be more tensions on the border. There 
will be less financing to the cultural sector due to the pandemic and the rise of 
Russia's protectionist measures. The BEAC level (governmental) will continue to 
slow down cultural communication, whereas the BRC (regional level) will be more 
successful due to the strong connections and mutual cross-border interests. 
Unfortunately, Russian regions are highly dependent on governmental financing. 
That is why it will be problematic to continue the cooperation at the same qualitative 
level if Russia changes the Barents region's governmental approach. 
The optimistic scenario also applies the “Back to normal” paradigm.  In this 
case, Russia loosens restrictions and turns toward the community and its ideals. This 
case reminds the uprising of cultural diplomacy and openness of the first Cultural 
programs. The optimistic scenario is less probable nowadays. The problems are so 
deep that there is almost no chance that they will be solved soon. There are no 
preconditions on the official level to choose this approach. The only probability rests 
on the fact that Russia is highly dependent on other actors in the field of exploration 
and usage of Arctic resources. It can shift the openness a little, and Russia will again 
hope to receive profits through cultural diplomacy.  
To sum up, the COVID-19 crisis has damaged the international cultural sector 
a lot. Much cross-border cooperation was at stake. It happened because the sector 
was not ready for the extreme measures which were applied. The regional level 
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cooperation was a mainly person-to-person type, and it was impossible to relocate it 
online.  
There are now two approaches for the cultural communication sector. The one 
is the returning of the previous normality and the usage of pre-COVID collaboration. 
The second is to evaluate the “new normality” of the COVID crisis and find new 
communication methods. According to the officials in the Barents region, Russia 
chose the first approach and hopes to use usual diplomacy channels as soon as 
possible. 
There are also two scenarios for the role of Russia in cultural communication 
in the post-COVID Barents region. Unfortunately, the optimistic one is not 
achievable soon. Russia declared that maintaining peace in the Arctic is the most 
important nowadays, so it continues to maintain it. The position now is a status quo, 
but the scenarios show that the status que can be positive or negative. Currently, it 
is a status quo with a negative attitude. Consequently, the role of Russia in cultural 




In this study, the aim was to analyze Russia's role in cultural cooperation in 
the Barents region. In conclusion of this study, the following conclusions can be 
drawn based on the set goals and objectives. 
First, it became clear during the study that in order to understand the meaning 
of the cultural cooperation for Russia, it is important to determine what is the basis 
for Russia's foreign cultural policy. Thus, Russia's foreign cultural policy is declared 
in Foreign policy concepts of the Russian Federation, although there are no specific 
documents that fully observe the problem and define a path for Russian cultural 
policy. It is essential to understand that almost all international cultural 
communication is somehow connected to the government, and consequently, the 
main representative of the culture internationally is the government itself.  
International cultural cooperation is vital for the state, but it is definitely not 
the priority. Cultural diplomacy is the primary tool of communication in this sector, 
but unfortunately, it is mainly the way of simple representation rather than building 
a good image of the state that works for its reputation.  
At the beginning of the ХХI century, scholars started using the term “soft 
power” according to the Russian cultural policy without an explicit use of this term. 
Unfortunately, it became clear that the understanding of “soft power” differs from 
the common one. Soft power is used not for external influence and making a good 
image but for maintaining national interests secured. As the BEAR situation shows, 
Russian governmental cultural policy has transformed from the openness of opinions 
and exchange of culture in the 90s to the deep concern of the use of soft power other 
than for national interests in the mid-10s. 
During the research, I found out that the Barents Euro-Arctic Region relations 
are not regulated by any additional documents on a culture other than the Concepts. 
The disappearance of mentioning the BEAR/BEAC from the Concepts 2016 shows 
the decline of interest in the region on a governmental level, although one of the 
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primary purposes of creating this type of communication in 1993 was the desire to 
have a platform for a dialogue with Russia. The priorities have changed, and now 
the one can see the decline of interest in that platform in Russia, at least in the case 
of culture.  
The role of Russia in cultural communication in the Barents region changed 
several times. Three periods were defined. From 1993 to approximately 2003 it was 
the period of active participation in all kinds of programs, high level of trust from 
Russia towards the west partners, the will of forming the region together, and the 
lack of finance to organize any activities. The projects were multicultural and mostly 
designed for the international participation. Because of the language barrier they 
were about dancing, theater, and music.  
The second one lasted almost a decade and ended with the Russian change of 
the course after the Ukrainian crisis. Russia took part in the Barents region's 
programs at two levels: state and regional, and in 2003-2015 and both the state and 
the regions were very active and had many expectations on the cultural 
communication. This decade Russia became a full event organizer and tried to bring 
a Russian point of view in the cultural cooperation in the Region.  At this stage, the 
role of Russia was transitional, and during this period, Russia could continue the 
open dialog or turn towards the protection of its national interests. The projects there 
reflected the Russian will to form a cooperation on the international terms. During 
this period many Russian government workers participated in the BEAR projects 
financed by the EU.  The essence of the projects organized by Russia were mostly 
connected to the common values and ideas. The biggest joint project was also 
implemented during this stage by all the states.  
The third period started after 2016 (approximately in 2016) and continues to 
this day. Since 2014 at the state level, Russia loses interest in close cooperation in 
the field of culture among the BEAR countries. It promotes and protects its national 
interests. Not the dialog and multiculturalism but maintaining peace and status quo 
in the Arctic region becomes Russia's central issue. The regions are more interested 
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in continuing cooperation; however, their ties are mainly bilateral and cross-border. 
A change in the state policy vector significantly affects the openness of borders, the 
number of festivals, and involvement in expensive large-scale projects. The 
remained projects were mostly bilateral, almost all leadership programs were closed, 
and the exchange became complicated. 
Recent events such as COVID-19 did not change the main vector of 
communication in the Barents region. The realistic scenario shows that culture is 
connected to the political situation, and there is little chance that it will change soon. 
The coronavirus accelerated the gap in Russian interests in cultural communication 
in the Barents region. There is a possibility that the cultural relations will return in a 
short way and without governmental support.  
To sum up, it was established that the role of Russia in the cultural cooperation 
in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region changed several times. The state completed the 
way from the recipient of projects and finance to the organizer of events and a fully 
involved member of the cooperation. Only the change of national interests and a 
political crisis almost stopped that evolution. More than that, this type of cooperation 
is still important for the Russian regions and unlikely to end. Nevertheless, lack of 
regional financial resources and a dependence on the state’s opinion cannot let the 
cultural dialogue be as open as possible.  
The study showed that Russia never wanted a full culture-based integration in 
the region, but it wanted to be noticed and respected. Currently, its ideas differ from 
the latest Cultural program, and the changes in politics have led to the loss of interest 
in cultural communication at the state level. Mutual trust is essential for the 
implementation of cultural programs. Let us hope that one day it will return, and 
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